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**BRITAIN'S  
DESIGNS  
ON NORWAY**



# BRITAIN'S DESIGNS ON NORWAY

*DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ANGLO-FRENCH  
POLICY OF EXTENDING THE WAR*

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**PREFATORY NOTE TO  
THE AMERICAN EDITION**



The Norwegian campaign is ended. The last remnant of the British Expeditionary Force has retired from Narvik. Life in Norway, according to unimpeachable neutral sources, is returning to normal. Norway is rapidly recuperating under German protection. What, then, is the reason for making available at this time to American readers the documents unearthed by the Germans in Norway?

The answer is simple enough.

In the first place, the lawless British blockade of neutral mails, including the frequent rifling of the American Clipper at Bermuda, makes it impossible to supply American students of history with the documents in question. Only a few copies of the editions published in German and English by order of the German Foreign Office in Berlin have escaped the pilferers.

However, the most important reason for releasing these papers to the American public now is the fact that the British plot in Norway is a laboratory case, fully corroborated by incontestable evidence, enabling the student of international affairs to study the methods employed by Great Britain to maintain her grasp on the political and economic life of other nations.

Britain's strategy is always the same: adroit propaganda, a vast net of espionage, the creation of "Fifth Columns," and the attempt to inveigle into her web members of the government and the army of the state upon which she fastens her clutches. While engaged in this game she invariably hides her imperialistic schemes under the cloak of morality and wards off suspicion from herself by diverting it to others.

All these elements are present in the case of Norway. The Norwegian people were determined to retain their neutrality in spite of incessant war propaganda, but certain members of the Norwegian Government and of the Norwegian Army, hypnotized by London, were secretly conniving with the British Intelligence Service and the British Government to thwart or circumvent this policy. Overwhelmed by the "insidious wiles" of foreign propaganda, they misjudged the reali-

ties of the situation, and mistakenly identified the interests of their own country with the selfish aims of Great Britain. While mouthing phrases about neutrality and uttering feeble protests against British encroachments upon the sovereignty of Norway, they were seduced or persuaded to aid the Allies by every means compatible with safety, and to enter the war, if at all, on the side of England and France.

No reprisal, no counteraction followed the outrage against the *Altmark*, the German ship that was attacked by the naval forces of Great Britain in Norwegian territorial waters. Shortly afterwards those who assume to speak for the British people frankly declared that they would not be deterred by "technicalities" from imposing their will on neutrals.

England, having cast aside the last bulwarks of international law, calmly proceeded to mine Norwegian territorial waters under the pretext of preventing the shipment of Norwegian ore to Germany. Actually, as our documents reveal, Britain's primary purpose was to protect the British Navy and British convoys, engaged in carrying a British Expeditionary Force to Norway on April 9, 1940. Germany forestalled the landing of the British forces by 10 hours—no more.

The documents found in Norway confirm the evidence previously received from diverse sources by German authorities that the Norwegian Government was neither able nor willing to defend its neutrality against Great Britain. All this is obvious from the statements of the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs found among the papers discovered in Oslo. The Norwegian Government had abandoned neutrality.

The Anglo-French resolve to make Norway and other Scandinavian countries the starting point for extensive operations against Germany dates a long time back. British consuls, cooperating with the British and French Naval Attachés in Oslo, were honeycombing the country with treason. This is obvious from the report of the French Naval Attaché, reproduced in these pages. The espionage of the Allies was carried out in part with the aid of local political and military Norwegian authorities.

These facts need not be reiterated here. They are set forth effectively by Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, in

his address to the Diplomatic Corps and the Representatives of the Foreign and Domestic Press on April 27, 1940. They are presented factually in the Summary preceding the documents and in the notes introducing the individual papers. They are confirmed beyond the possibility of doubt by the damning evidence of the documents themselves.

British policy has always been to create dissension and distrust in Europe and in other continents in order to bolster up her top-heavy Empire. Shielded by a chain of catspaw allies, England's slogan was "Business as usual." She has always attempted to press into her service the wealth and the sinews of others. She was prepared to fight to the "last Norwegian" and to the "last Frenchman." When the last Norwegian and the last Frenchman refused to die for her, she turned against them the batteries of calumny. She has repudiated the legitimate French Government. Shortly afterward she declared her love for both former Allies with bombs. She is determined to starve them, if she can, by extending her "illegal" and "indefensible" blockade (we are quoting the characterization of President Wilson) to every country in Europe.

The experience of Norway and now of France, coupled with the astonishing revelations of British intrigue disclosed in the following pages, is making the few remaining neutrals in Europe wary of British diplomacy, British dupes and British tools, and promises of British statesmen. One after another neutrals walked into the British trap, baited with British "guarantees"—to be deserted and traduced in the end by their British "Ally."

Now that the British have been driven back into the sea from the Continent, all Europe can breathe more freely. Germany, her statesmen announce, is not fighting against British culture, nor against the British "way of life." Germany's sole objective is to destroy the power of Great Britain to meddle in Continental affairs.

No doubt, the story of Norway was reenacted in every country which fell a prey to foreign influence and sacrificed itself for Great Britain in the recent conflicts. Because by a lucky chance the papers revealing the military dispositions of the British as well as the mental reservations and gentlemen's agreements of Norwegian statesmen fell

into German hands, Norway can be cited as an object lesson, as convincing as it is complete.

The American Edition of *Documents Concerning the Anglo-French Policy of Extending the War* is based on Publication No. 4 of the German Foreign Office and on a popular edition, subsequently issued under the title *Britain's Designs on Norway*. The present volume contains the facsimiles published in the two Berlin editions. No pertinent material, no document is omitted. Even errors and misspellings are faithfully reproduced. The explanatory notes, borrowed from the popular edition, are printed in small type and indicated by brackets. Minor alterations in the arrangement and occasional condensations of the notes do not affect by one iota the authenticity or the essence of these revelations.



## **ADDRESS**

**Delivered by Joachim von Ribbentrop,  
German Foreign Minister, to the Dip-  
lomatic Corps and the Representatives  
of the Foreign and Domestic Press in  
Berlin on April 27, 1940**



Your Excellencies,  
Gentlemen of the Diplomatic Missions, and Gentlemen of the Foreign  
and Domestic Press:

I have invited you here today in order to acquaint you directly with the contents of a series of political documents, which, in the opinion of the German Government, are of the utmost importance to the people of all countries and particularly to the Governments of neutral states.

In the name of the German Government, I have the following remarks to make concerning these documents:

On September 3, the rulers of Britain and France declared war on the German Reich. There were no rational grounds of any kind for their action. The German people and their Fuehrer have since January, 1933, constantly reaffirmed their intention and desire to live in peace and friendship with the British and French peoples. The German people, however, have accepted with solemn determination the war that has been thrust upon them. The scheme of the Anglo-French rulers to break up the German Reich, to take away the rights of the German people and to ruin them economically will be parried by the united forces of the German nation and thus frustrated.

Since they knew that a direct attack on the Siegfried Line would be hopelessly futile and since their Polish ally, who had been egged on against Germany, had failed, the British and French Governments began a desperate search for new means of coming to grips with Germany.

Thus, the extension of the theater of war became the principal basis of war policy in the minds of the political and military leaders of the Western Powers. Since the beginning of this year, therefore, Britain and France have attempted by all the means in their power to bring about a shift in the war front by involving neutral states. The smaller European countries appeared, to the British rulers, the most suitable victims of this plan. Their people were expected to become first line reinforcements, thus obviating, according to the old

British tradition, the shedding of British blood. For propaganda purposes in support of this war extension policy, British and French politicians commenced a systematic campaign against the principle of neutrality in itself and against every endeavor of the neutral states to defend their neutrality and to keep themselves out of the war.

On January 21, 1940, Mr. Churchill opened this campaign with a notorious speech against neutrality and a challenge to the neutrals to join Britain and France in the war against Germany. Up to now, no speech of a British or French politician has failed to include a demand that the neutrals take part in this war. Here are a few examples:

On January 31, Mr. Chamberlain sharply rebuked the neutral states for their "uninterested indifference." On February 24, Mr. Chamberlain called the flagrant attack on the German vessel, *Altmark*, in Norwegian territorial waters only a "technical breach of neutrality." On February 27, Mr. Churchill asserted that he had heard enough talk about the rights of neutrals. On March 20, Sir Oliver Stanley, the British War Minister, said that the British were willing and apt students of the doctrine maintaining the disregard of the rights of neutrals as advantageous. On March 30, Mr. Churchill announced that it would not be fair if the Western Powers held fast to legal agreements in a life and death struggle. On April 5, Lord de la Warr stated that neither Germany nor the neutrals could expect Britain to handicap herself by observing the letter of the Law. On April 6, 1940, the British Minister of Labor declared that neither Germany nor the neutrals could count on the Western Powers keeping strictly within the provisions of International Law. On April 10, 1940, Lord Halifax warned the neutrals not to wait too long before they called for help because "waiting" was dangerous for them. M. Reynaud recommended, on April 11, that the neutrals "reconsider their situation."

Thus far the utterances of the British and French politicians represented only a veiled challenge or a veiled threat to the neutrals. However, on April 12, Mr. Duff Cooper let the mask fall all the way off when he declared with brutal candor that, after having made clear to the neutrals that their own freedom and independence were at stake, the British would now openly tell them what part each had to play in the campaign to destroy Germany. If one State or another hesitated,

the British would immediately proceed to overcome such hesitation.

Britain and France saw in the Russo-Finnish conflict the first opportunity of gaining their objective, an extension of the war front. On March 12, M. Daladier and, on March 19, Mr. Chamberlain affirmed publicly that they were determined to intervene in the conflict with military power, making use of the territory of the Northern States as an operation base. However, their action depended upon the consent of the Scandinavian States to permit the passage of their troops. These public declarations by the Heads of the Governments of Britain and France were naked frauds. The German Government is acquainted with the report of the Finnish Minister in Paris to his Government of March 12. In this report the Minister states that M. Daladier and Mr. Churchill had given him definite assurance that immediately upon receiving a call from Finland, the British and French troops, who were already standing by, would set out from their harbors to make a landing in Norway. The passage of the troops would be conveyed to Norway and Sweden in a note, without previous request for the permission of the Governments of the two countries. Diplomatic relations between Britain and France and the Soviet Union were to be broken off immediately. Mr. Churchill had already flown to Paris on March 11, the report reveals, expressly to make a last-minute attempt to obstruct the conclusion of peace between Russia and Finland.

Further convincing proof of the extent to which Britain and France had already prepared for their intervention in the North is afforded by a great number of documents which fell into the hands of German troops upon their entry into Norway. A small number of these documents have been selected for publication today. The documents found in Narvik afford a comprehensive insight into the activity of the British Secret Service in Norway which had the task of carrying out the reconnaissance work and preparations for the landing of the British and French Expeditionary force and the occupation of Norway. The British spies operated along the entire Norwegian coast and also in Oslo and other cities in the interior of the country. It is evident that they had prepared every detail of the landing and disposition of troops in a systematic way, through the espionage organization of the Secret Service. Furthermore, as I shall outline in

detail later, the Norwegian Government then in power had long been secretly in accord with the British.

The intentions of the British and French Governments in planning the dispatch of their expeditionary force went far beyond assistance for Finland against Russia. This is shown by a report of February 8 by the French Naval Attaché in Oslo. The report states for the benefit of the local Norwegian authorities, that all the intelligence work necessary for the landing would be carried out under the *pretext* of preparing transports to Finland.

All these British preparations for the extension of the war against Germany in the North were made with complete secrecy. However, Mr. Churchill revealed their true intentions and aims through a series of indiscreet utterances, which came to the knowledge of the German Government. For this reason a report of the Norwegian Minister in London to his Government concerning a Press Conference which Mr. Churchill held on February 2 in London for the Press Attachés of the neutral countries is included among the documents revealed today.

In the report of this conference it is stated that (1) Mr. Churchill raged against Norway and Sweden because the Swedish ore was still permitted to reach Germany, (2) he openly acknowledged that his principal objective was to involve the Scandinavian States in the war, (3) that the best way of achieving this aim was to embroil the Scandinavian States on the side of Finland.

In connection with this, I wish to make the following declaration, based on the extensive material previously in the possession of the German Government, that has now been supplemented by other equally important discoveries:

(1) It is perfectly plain from all the communications and documents which have come to the knowledge of the German Government that the Swedish Government interpreted its Declaration of Neutrality very seriously indeed; it neither committed nor encouraged any act incompatible with that declaration.

(2) The German Government is necessarily of the opinion, and will now offer proof by the publication of the documents involved, that the former Norwegian Government was not only prepared to tolerate action designed to extend the war front, but also was ready, if neces-

sary, to participate in or to support such action. From the evidence, especially from the papers recently found by our troops in Norway, it appears beyond all doubt not only that British espionage was conducted with the knowledge of local and central authorities, but also that many Norwegian leaders, particularly the naval heads, aided and abetted these British activities to the greatest extent possible.

Proof that the Norwegian Government had already contemplated entering the war on the side of Britain and France is found in the document reporting a Government conference held on March 2, by the former Norwegian Prime Minister, Nygaarsvold.

Minister Koht declared cynically that if Britain demanded Norway's support against Russia, an action which would in reality be only for the purpose of extending the war front, Norway would be obliged to say "No"—but in such a way that she could easily substitute a "Yes" for the "No." Herr Koht then declared that, if Norway could not avoid becoming involved in the conflict, the Norwegian Government should immediately adopt an attitude that would prevent their country from entering the war "on the wrong side."

When, because of the conclusion of peace in Finland, the Western Powers momentarily lost their best opportunity for an intervention in the North, they immediately attempted to devise new ways and means of achieving their aim to extend the war area.

The continued efforts made by Britain and France to stir up trouble in Southeastern Europe, the persistent attempts by the British Secret Service to sabotage various parts of the Balkans, the mobilization of the army under General Weygand, etc., may serve as examples.

To give their intentions a moral cloak, those who hold the reins in Britain and France made even more obvious attempts—after the conclusion of peace between Russia and Finland which came so inopportunistically for the Allies—to allege German violations of Norwegian territorial waters.

Among the many newspaper articles written to order for this purpose, the report of the Paris *Temps* of March 27 (at a time when the preparations of the Western Powers for the occupation of Norway were already almost concluded) is characteristic. The paper in question speaks of a "systematic violation" of territorial waters by Ger-



many, and asserts that the Allies could regard themselves justified in no longer respecting the neutrality of these waters.

The same tendency is revealed in a *Havas* dispatch of the same date which states that passivity falsifies the real meaning of neutrality and that the action of the Allies was confined to the objective of restoring the disturbed equilibrium. What this "restoration of the equilibrium" meant was made clear to the German Government by a conversation between French Premier Reynaud and a foreign diplomat in Paris a few days later (March 30).

The unguarded declaration of the French Premier contains the assertion that the danger zones in the West and especially in the South no longer existed, because decisive and important actions in Northern Europe were to be carried out by the Allies in the course of the next few days.

It therefore seemed reasonable to the German Government to complete immediately the measures which had already been taken and to attain a state of greater preparedness for any emergency, so that it would be possible to intervene at any moment. The realization of the imminent danger was strengthened when on April 8 the Government of the Reich learned that the British and French Governments intended to declare on that date that the neutrality of Scandinavian waters no longer existed and to begin certain operations forthwith.

The Fuehrer consequently ordered the German fleet to sail so that it would be able to intervene immediately if the plan which had been communicated to the German Government should be put into operation.

The mining of Norwegian territorial waters by Great Britain, announced for April 8, was undertaken on the preceding day by the British Government, having as its alleged object the barring of Norwegian territorial waters to German shipping.

Actually, however, the mines which encircled the Norwegian harbors were intended to insure the safety of the British Expeditionary Force, which at that time was already in the North Sea. On April 8 the British troops who were intended to occupy Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik had already embarked and had left the harbors. At

that moment the British Admiralty received intelligence that German Naval forces had appeared in the North Sea. The Admiralty, connecting the appearance of the German fleet with the intended landing, immediately sent out messages to recall the transport ships, and made every effort to contact the German fleet in battle. It was, however, impossible to recall all the transport ships, and several were captured and destroyed by German bombers.

The German counteraction on the morning of April 9 took place at exactly the right moment to prevent or frustrate Franco-British landing operations on the Norwegian coast.

When the responsible statesmen in England and France recognized that their plans for the occupation of Scandinavian territory had been shattered, Messrs. Chamberlain, Churchill, Halifax and Reynaud came before the public with their usual dramatic airs and levied the most serious accusations at Germany, accompanied by categorical assurances that they themselves never intended any action against the sovereign territory of Scandinavia except mine-laying.

The British Prime Minister made the following statement on the subject in the House of Commons:

"It is asserted by the German Government that their invasion of Norway was a reprisal for the action of the Allies in Norwegian territorial waters. This statement will, of course, deceive no one. At no time did the Allies contemplate any occupation of Scandinavian territory so long as it was not attacked by Germany. Any allegations by Germany to the contrary are pure invention, and have no foundation in fact."

In the name of the German Government and above all in the name of truth and justice, Gentlemen, I now wish to lay before you the documents which prove that the assurances of the masters of Britain and France are only falsehoods and misrepresentations.

Recent communiqués of our adversaries informed you, Gentlemen, of the "great victories" gained by the Allies in the regions of Hamar and Elverum. Actual fighting has taken place in this area, in which British troops participated. In the course of these engagements, the German troops succeeded in breaking through all enemy positions.

They drove back the opposing British and Norwegian units and eventually routed them.

In clashes with the British in the Lillehammer region, German troops captured the British Brigade Staff in command of that sector, as well as a part of the 8th Battalion of the Sherwood Foresters belonging to the 148th British Infantry Brigade. Among innumerable other documents, the complete plan of operations for the British occupation of Norway was found in the possession of the Brigade Staff and on prisoners taken in the successful fighting to the north of Trondheim. At the same time, the various orders of the Brigade and of the subordinate troop formations based upon the plan were also secured. These military orders, the first section of which is made public to the world today, prove that the British landing in Norway had long been prepared in every detail and that the order to land had been given to the first formations of the Expeditionary Corps on April 6 and 7.

This first section includes, for example, the plan of operation of the 8th Battalion of the Sherwood Foresters, dated April 7, which proves that the Battalion was then already making its way to Stavanger on the British cruiser *Glasgow*. It is further proved that other troops of the same brigade had been instructed to seize the aerodrome at Sola immediately upon landing.

When it became known on April 8 that the German fleet had put to sea, the Battalion was called back and disembarked.

Gentlemen, I do not intend to explain to you in detail the contents of these documents. They speak for themselves. You will find them supplemented by a number of diaries belonging to British officers and men as well as by subsequent statements of British prisoners.

The Government of the German Reich will in a series of publications furnish documentary proof that:

- (1) Britain and France had prepared the occupation of Norway for a long time.
- (2) The Norwegian Government was cognizant of this fact.
- (3) In contrast to Sweden, the Norwegian Government had acquiesced to this fact and was even prepared, as afterwards actually happened, to participate in the war on the side of Britain and France.

VON RIBBENTROP'S ADDRESS

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- (4) The British attempt was frustrated within a few hours by Germany's intervention.
- (5) The declarations on the subject since made by British Government officials are unqualified falsehoods.



## **SUMMARY**





While carrying out the protective measures which Germany had to resort to in Norway, German troops made some extremely interesting discoveries. The findings disclose valuable information on the British plan of landing troops in neutral Norway, a dastardly venture, foiled at the last moment by German action. The documents also reveal the way in which prospective British military measures on Norwegian territory were being prepared. A number of these documents are published herewith.

During the first clash between German and British troops near Lillehammer, parts of the 8th Battalion of the Sherwood Foresters (148th Infantry Brigade) were captured. On this occasion a general plan of operations (known as the Stratforce Plan) for the British Expeditionary Force in Norway was seized along with various orders for the Brigade and for the forces taken prisoner. These military orders, which comprise Group A, prove that operations for a British landing in Norway had been minutely prepared during the weeks preceding Germany's action, and that the expedition got under way on April 6 and 7. The operating orders for the 8th Battalion of the Sherwood Foresters, dated April 7, show that on that day the Battalion was already on board the British cruiser *Glasgow* en route for Norway, where it was to be landed at Stavanger. The Stratforce Plan reveals that another unit to be landed in Norway was the Fifth Company of the First Battalion of the Leicesters. The transportation plan for this unit is available, and also gives Stavanger as its destination. Originally the Company was to have embarked on the *S. S. Cyclop* at Leith on April 7. A diary which was found contains, for April 7, an entry reading: "We are going to Stavanger." This entry proves that the code term 547, used in the orders, refers to Stavanger. These papers are documentary evidence that the British Expeditionary Force was well on its way to Norwegian ports when Germany proceeded to take countermeasures. The statements made by British statesmen to the effect that the Allies at no time contemplated the

occupation of Scandinavian territory are thus refuted by the orders given to the Expeditionary Force.

The intended British landing had been very carefully prepared beforehand by espionage on the part of British and French officials in Norway. Upon entering the city of Narvik the German troops found a number of telegram books together with certain important letters of the local British Consul.<sup>1</sup> Certain documents belonging to the French Naval Attaché came into the possession of the German authorities in Oslo. The extracts from these papers given below prove that the Western Powers had enveloped Norway in a closely-meshed net of espionage. Former British naval officers, camouflaged as Consular Officials, were stationed in all the more important Norwegian ports. These British "consuls" acted ostensibly under orders from the Foreign Office, but they also received instructions from the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty (part of the British Secret Service). The officials carrying on this espionage kept in close contact with the British and French Naval Attachés in Oslo, who traveled up and down the country in search of detailed information.<sup>2</sup>

The documents reproduced below reveal that from the end of 1939 until April, 1940, British espionage in Norway redoubled its efforts and was being conducted in a more and more vigorous manner. Apparently, Britain deemed herself in possession of all the necessary information when she proceeded to invade Norway—an attempt which was frustrated by Germany at the eleventh hour. The questionnaires addressed to the British agents were intended to provide all the details necessary to effect a landing of troops in the Norwegian ports and to carry out the first operations of the Expeditionary Force. Special interest was taken as to the localities and quays where troops might be landed.<sup>3</sup> Equal importance was attached to information concerning aerodromes which were to serve as air bases for the British Expeditionary Force.<sup>4</sup> Another matter investigated was the extent of coal and fuel stocks which were to be seized by the invading army.<sup>5</sup> The British and French papers both show that toward the end of January the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Groups B and C.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Group C, No. 19.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Group B, No. 10, and Group C, No. 21.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Group B, No. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Group C, No. 21.

naval authorities of the Western Powers insisted on more and more information. Early in April, when it had been decided to effect a landing in Norway, a new British Consul for Narvik was nominated. He was to have arrived on April 8.<sup>6</sup> The nomination of this new official was explained as being due to "special circumstances." The Admiralty was obviously anxious to have a special confidential agent, who had been previously informed in London on all the details of the Norwegian plans, to abet the proposed landing in Narvik.

The local Norwegian authorities were kept in the dark as to the systematic preparation for the armed violation of their neutrality by the Allies, who described their activities as the preliminaries for the aid they had promised Finland. The French Naval Attaché reported that it had been possible to enlist the cooperation of Norwegian military authorities in the reconnaissance activities "by feigning interest in military transport to Finland."<sup>7</sup> The fact that the British Consul in Narvik was asked to report regularly on troop movements in Northern Norway,<sup>8</sup> that the Admiralty's questionnaires dealt with possibilities of defense in Norwegian ports,<sup>9</sup> and that, finally, the French Naval Attaché described a certain locality on the Trondheim Fjord as an "ideal place for secret landings"<sup>10</sup> clearly reveals that planning to assist Finland would give the Western Powers a welcome opportunity to land on the Scandinavian coast, should the necessity arise, even against the will of Norway.

The far-reaching activities of the British naval officers, masquerading as consular officials, and of the French naval attachés could certainly not pass unnoticed by the Norwegian Government, since this form of espionage included the questioning of local Norwegian authorities and military chiefs. It is thereby once more proved that the Norwegian Government lacked the firm determination to oppose the British maneuvers at a moment when the prevention of such activities could at least have provided some preliminary action toward the establishment of genuine neutrality.

The following documents also prove that the former Norwegian

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Group B, No. 18.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Group D, No. 22.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Group B, Nos. 13-17.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Group C, No. 21.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Group D, No. 23.

Government not only failed to do its duty as a neutral power, but also tolerated open intervention in Norwegian territorial waters and aided and abetted the British in their intention to land.

The true feelings of the Norwegian Government of that time are revealed in a series of documents discovered in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry.<sup>11</sup> On March 2, 1940, the British Minister in Oslo handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister a demand to the effect that the Norwegian Government permit Allied troops to cross Norwegian territory en route for Finland. A similar demand was made of the Swedish Government. The minutes of the meeting of the Norwegian Cabinet on March 2<sup>12</sup> show that Norway was not prepared to allow Allied troops to pass through her territory unless the Swedish Government would also give its consent to such action, which would obviously have been contrary to the spirit of neutrality. On the other hand, the same document discloses the fact that Herr Koht, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, did not intend to allow any measures for the prevention of such passage to be put into operation. In Herr Koht's opinion, Norway would be content in case of Allied invasion merely to lodge a formal protest. The Foreign Minister justified this view by saying that Norway should on no account take a line which "might involve her in war on the wrong side." The only explanation for this can be seen in the fact that the Norwegian Government was at that time prepared not only to put up with a British violation of its neutrality but even to join forces with Britain.

Responsible circles in Oslo were in no doubt as to the real intentions of the Western Powers, who at that stage still believed that they could cover up their imminent violation of neutrality by proclaiming their desire to come to the aid of Finland. This, too, is proved by documents found in the Oslo archives. On February 5, the Norwegian Minister in London forwarded a strictly confidential report on the cooperation of Norwegian newspaper correspondents with the First Lord of the Admiralty, which gave a very clear idea of Mr. Winston Churchill's views on the neutrality of the Scandinavian States.<sup>13</sup> Churchill admitted quite candidly that the chief aim of British politics was to

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Group E.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Group E, No. 27.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Group E, No. 28.

draw Norway and Sweden into the war. The best way for this to take place would be for the Scandinavian countries to take sides with Finland.

Thus, although the Norwegian Government could not be in the least doubt as to Britain's real intention, it continued to permit and to foster British espionage on Norwegian soil. Its whole demeanor—as became apparent in its unconvincing protests against repeated British incursions into Norwegian territorial waters—was based upon the systematic encouragement of Britain's intentions, which were so obviously contrary to the laws of neutrality. The former Norwegian Government has, therefore, openly disregarded the vital interests of the Norwegian people in order to aid the Western Powers in their plans for the extension of the war.



## **DOCUMENTS**





**GROUP A**  
**ORDERS FOUND**  
**ON BRITISH OFFICERS TAKEN PRISONER**  
**AT LILLEHAMMER**



## **DOCUMENT NO. 1**

### **THE STRATFORCE PLAN**

[The action of the German troops against the 148th British Infantry Brigade near Lillehammer was so sudden and unexpected that the Brigade Staff was unable to take its secret material and orders northward with it. A complete plan of operations for the landing of British troops in southern Norway thus fell into the hands of the German troops. The plan, which the British High Command named the "Stratforce Plan," covered the occupation of three ports in southern Norway. The proposed landings had been frustrated long before the Germans found the plan. However, the maintenance instructions and other valuable information it contained could still have been of use to the Brigade.]

**SECRET**  
**COPY NO. 30**

### **STRATFORCE PLAN AND FIRST MAINTENANCE PROJECT**

**STRATFORD \* PLAN  
AND FIRST MAINTENANCE PROJECT**

**CONTENTS**

1. General
2. Secrecy
3. Establishments and Scale of Equipment
4. Relations with local authorities
5. Transport and Accommodation
6. Maintenance
7. Medical
8. Reporting of Casualties
9. Reinforcements
10. Accounting Instructions
11. Courts Martial
12. Maps
13. Intercommunication
14. Security Intelligence arrangements
15. Signal Security
16. Relationship between British Troops and Local Military Authorities
17. Special Fittings to Respirators
18. Recognition of Aircraft

\* The spelling "Stratford" in place of "Stratforce" appears in several places throughout the original of this document. Although it is obviously an error on the part of the naval officer who wrote it, we retain it for the sake of authenticity. All misspellings and grammatical mistakes that occur in the originals of ensuing documents have likewise been faithfully reproduced.

**APPENDICES.**

Appendix "A". Composition of Stratford.

Appendix "B". Provisional Ration Scale.

Appendix "C". Signal Instructions.

Appendix "D". Special Scale of Explosives.

**STRATFORCE PLAN  
AND FIRST MAINTENANCE PROJECT****1. General.**

This plan is for the despatch of small forces of infantry, engineers and attached troops to:—512, 547, 548.

**2. Secrecy.**

The most stringent precautions will be taken to ensure the secrecy of the move required to put this plan into operation. In order to achieve this end the plan will never be referred to except by its code name, and until embarkation has been completed the destination of the force will not be disclosed to anyone.

**3. Establishments and Scale of Equipment.**

A detailed order of battle and establishments for the force have been issued under S.D.1(b) B.M. No. XXX 52 dated 2nd February, 1940.

A copy is attached at Appendix 'A'.

A special scale of G.1098 equipment has been issued to units.

**4. Relations with Local Authorities.**

The force will be entirely dependent on local authorities for transport, fresh supplies, accommodation, hospital and ambulance services.

The closest liaison between local military commanders and local civil authorities will therefore be essential. Arrangements should be made with the British Consul or Vice Consul at each port for the provision of interpreters as required.

**5. Transport and Accommodation.**

No transport or tentage will be taken with the force. One of the first tasks of the Commanders at each place on disembarkation will be to arrange for the provision of sufficient transport to move baggage for general purposes, and for accommodation for his men.

**6. Maintenance.**

Maintenance from the United Kingdom will be by weekly or ten day sailings in normal trade shipping from the United Kingdom to 548, and thence by local ships. It is possible that a major British force will be operating from 512 in which case this force will be responsible for the maintenance of STRATFORD.

The force will thus have to rely largely on local purchase. For this reason two R.A.S.C. officers, a paymaster and a Warrant Officer R.A.O.C. will accompany each force. Special instructions for the R.A.S.C. officers are being issued under separate cover.

(a) **Supplies.** 14 days supplies will accompany the force. An additional 10 days supplies are being shipped to 512 for distribution from that port to 547 and 548 as required. These will be loaded under .0. arrangements. Of these, 2 days are made up in self contained rations in the form of 4 cases per 32 men per day. The remainder are in bulk and will be taken over by the senior R.A.S.C. officer, accompanying each force immediately on landing, to open up a small *Detail* Issue Depot. Fresh produce will be obtained locally by an R.A.S.C. officer.

A provisional ration scale for the force is attached at Appendix "B". If local conditions require, this scale may be varied accordingly by the force commander and reported to the War Office in due course.

- (b) Amendments in strength of units will be sent to the R.A.S.C. officer at each port one day in advance of requirements.
- (c) **Fuel and Light.** No supplies of fuel and light are being provided except candles for emergency use. Supplies, including petrol for cookers, will be obtained locally.

- (d) **Hospital Supplies.** These will be obtained locally by the R.A.S.C. officer on the advice of the Senior Medical Officer.
- (e) **Ammunition.** Ammunition of the following scale per battalion will accompany the force:—

@ S.A.A.	Mk. VII 178425 Tracer 2000.	2640 rounds.
A/T Rifle ( $\frac{1}{2}$ scale)		{ 195 H.E.
3" Mortar		{ 117 Smoke.
2" Mortar		864 Smoke.
@ .38" (Revolver)		894
Hand Grenades		180
Verey Lights		{ 384 illuminating
		{ 48 red
		{ 48 green
Explosives	A special scale of explosives has been arranged and will be taken. (This is shown at Appendix 'D').	

@ Infantry will embark with rifle and revolver ammunition in pouches. No other type of ammunition will be carried unboxed.

- (f) **Ordnance Stores.** Indents for Ordnance Stores will be sent to the Brigade Ordnance Warrant Officer at each port. If urgently required they will be met by local purchase so far as possible, in all other circumstances the indents will be forwarded to the War Office.
- (g) **Mess Equipment, Sports Gear, etc.** Detailed instructions have been issued separately showing the extra allowance (dead weight) which may be utilized for the carriage of the above mentioned stores.

## 7. Medical.

No medical personnel other than the A.D.M.S., S.M.O., and the personnel attached to the battalion will accompany the force initially. Slightly augmented medical equipment of battalions will be taken. Immediate arrangements will have to be made locally for the use of ambulances, hospitals and other local facilities; the senior medical officer in each place will make immediate contacts with local military

medical authorities, and if these do not exist, with the local health officers.

Instructions will be issued to the A.D.M.S. by the War Office under separate cover.

**8. Reporting of Casualties.**

- (a) Unit orderly room Serjeants for duty at 2nd Echelon will report to Queens High Cliffe Hotel, Margate.
- (b) In the initial stages casualties will be reported from 512 and 547 to Force H.Q. (548). The latter will consolidate and transmit deaths of officers and other ranks by /T if traffic facilities permit.
- (c) Except as modified in (b) above the normal procedure laid down in F.S.R. Vol. 1, Section 26, will be carried out, as far as local communications permit.
- (d) In the case of admissions to hospital the Nominal Rolls on A.F.W.3034 and progress reports on A.F.W.3034A will be prepared by officers commanding at 512, 547 and 548 respectively and despatched by post, as sailings permit to Casualty Section, 2 Bainbridge Street, New Oxford Street, London, W.C.1.

**9. Reinforcements.**

Will be demanded by W/T direct to War Office (Forcedly One).

**10. Accounting Instructions.**

- (a) Payment for supplies and services purchased locally will be effected through the paymaster accompanying each force.
- (b) Officers' bills, etc., duly certified as to delivery, should be forwarded to the paymaster.
- (c) Imprest for bills and local services, payment and accounting of advances to officers and cash payments to other ranks will be governed by F.S.R. Vol. 1, Chapter XXI.

**11. Courts Martial.**

A Court Martial warrant for the Officer Commanding Stratforce will be issued direct.



**12. Maps.**

These will be delivered to Force H.Q. on board ship before embarkation under arrangements made by G.S.(P) War Office. Except for sheets of the 1/1,000,000 map only photographic copies of 534 and 535 1/100,000 (and in some places 1/200,000) will be available at the commencement of the campaign. These maps are very old and mostly of pre-1900 date; they will carry no grid and in most cases no contours.

**13. Intercommunication.**

- (a) *Within the Force.* One infantry brigade signal section provided to link up the three locations. Wireless and the civil telegraph system will be used.

Special aerials have been provided for the wireless sets of the signal section to enable the ranges to be covered.

- (b) *Between Force H.Q., and the War Office.* There is no direct cable line from 512, 547 or 548. Communications between Force H.Q. and the War Office will therefore be mainly by W/T from 548. In an emergency the Naval Control Service Officer on the Consular staff will provide a channel of communication.

Technical Instructions to O.C. Sigs. of the force will be issued under separate cover. A copy is attached at Appendix "C."

**Ciphers**

- (a) H.Q. Force will be provided with the necessary high grade cipher books for communication to the War Office.
- (b) Within the force subject to normal security restrictions, stencil cipher will be used.
- (c) If the necessity arises for using interdepartmental cipher (e.g. to local British authorities, Military Attache Stockholm, etc.), arrangements will be made with the local consulate.
- (d) Personnel is being provided as follows:—
- |                     |  |                |
|---------------------|--|----------------|
| ( i ) Force H.Q.    | 1 officer.   | 3 other ranks. |
| ( ii ) Brigade H.Q. |  | 2 other ranks. |
| ( iii ) At 512.     | Regimental personnel will work the stencil cipher. |                |

**14. Security Intelligence Arrangements.**

- (a) An intelligence officer and cipher personnel are located at each port. Censorship of correspondence will be carried out by officers of units. The censor stamps and cipher stencils will be issued before embarkation. Full details of censorship and what may be written in letters are contained in Manual of Military Intelligence, Pamphlet No. 2.
- (b) The correct address for all correspondence of personnel in the force will be:—

Number, Rank and Name,  
Squadron, Battery or Company, etc.  
Unit or H.Q. (if serving on the  
H.Q. Staff), c/o A.P.O.

- (c) The control of all press representatives will be in the hands of Officer Commanding troops at each port who will be guided by instructions issued by the Officer Commanding the force.

**15. Signal Security.**

- (a) The reference to places by numbers under the code already issued will cease after embarkation.
- (b) Local telephones will have to be used. The utmost discretion is necessary as no control of this service will be possible.
- (c) A block of code names will be issued to Force H.Q. under separate cover.
- (d) The telegraphic address of the force is:—

STRATFORCE for	548
CONVERT for	547
OUTLOOK for	512

These names will be registered with postal authorities on arrival overseas. All telegrams from U.K. [United Kingdom] will be sent to the force c/o War Office until further instructions are issued.

**16. Relationship between British Troops and Local Military Authorities.**

Compliments will be paid to Local Military Officers, etc., according to equivalent rank as if they were British Officers.

**17. Special fittings to Respirators.**

Special fittings to respirators are being sent in bulk with other stores. These should be fitted to respirators as soon as possible after arrival. Fittings are packed in boxes of 60 and are provided on the scale of one for each Officer or Other Rank. Instructions for fitting are attached to the inside of the lid of the box in which they are packed. Unit gas instructors should supervise the fitting and ensure that the instructions are rigidly followed.

**18. Recognition of Aircraft.**

Steps should be taken to ensure that personnel are able to distinguish enemy aircraft from those of the allies and neutral countries. The local allied Military Authorities should be able to help in this connection, in addition, silhouettes of GERMAN aircraft will be issued separately.

**Amendment.****Para. 6. Line 5.**

After "STRATFORCE." Add: "The first maintenance ship should arrive within a fortnight of the arrival of the force."

**Para. 6(a). Line 2.**

For "10 days supplies" Read "20 days supplies."

**Secret****Stratforce Plan and First Maintenance Project****Amendment No. 1**

**General.** ADD at end of paragraph 1.

"In the event of the forces at 547 having to withdraw they will go to 548.

"Commander 547 will investigate on the spot to discover what shipping could be made available to carry out the move. He will make this the subject of an early report to the War Office through Force H.Q.

"The provision of escorts will be arranged by the War Office."

**Paragraph 5. First line.**

DELETE from "No transport" to "Force." Substitute:—"5. The following scale of transport for the force at 547 will be embarked

for despatch so that it can follow shortly after the arrival of the units.

*Transport for 547.*

	<i>No.</i>
Bde. H.Q.	
M/C	3
Trucks 15-cwt. office	1
Trucks water tank	1
Rifle Bns. (two).	
M/C	14
Trucks 15-cwt. office	2
Trucks A.A.L.M.Gs.	8
Trucks Water Tank	4
Carriers Bren Gun	20
Fd. Coy. (less one sec.)	
M/C	5
Truck 15 cwt. water	1
" " tools & stores	4
" " compressor	2
Det. Sigs.	
M/C	2
Vehicles	4
Total	71

Other than this no transport or tentage will be taken with the Force."

G.S.(P).  
4th April, 1940

**Appendix "A"**

**Composition of Stratford**

Destination.	Unit.
548.	{ Infantry Brigade H.Q. (Force H.Qs.) 4 Lincolns ¼ K.O.Y.L.I. Sec. 55 Fd. Coy., R.E. Brigade Sig. Sec. (49 Div. Sigs) (less detachments).
547.	{ 148 Infantry Brigade H.Q. ¼ Leicesters. 8 Foresters. 55 Fd., Coy. (less 1 Sec.) Detachment Sigs.
512.	{ Hallams. Detachment Sigs. Details.

## Appendix "B"

## Provisional Ration Scale

Commodity.	Scale of Issue.	Equivalents.
	<i>Ozs.</i>	
Bread	16	Biscuit 12 oz.
Meat Frozen or Fresh	14	Preserved Meat 12 oz.
		<i>or</i>
		M & V Ration 24 oz.
Bacon	4	Tinned Bacon $3\frac{1}{3}$ oz.
		<i>or</i>
		Meat Loaf 4 oz.
Cheese	1	Tinned Cheese 1 oz.
		<i>or</i>
		Eating Chocolate 2 oz.
Tea	$\frac{3}{4}$	
Cocoa	$\frac{1}{2}$	
Sugar	4	
Milk Condensed	3	
Jam or Marmalade	2	Dried Fruits 2 oz.
		<i>or</i>
		Golden Syrup 2 oz.
Margarine	$3\frac{3}{4}$	
Oatmeal	2	Rice 2 oz.
Fresh Potatoes	12	Tinned Potatoes 6 oz.
Fresh Vegetables	8	Tinned Vegetables 4 oz.
		<i>or</i>
		Tinned Tomatoes 4 oz.
Dried Peas or Beans	$2\frac{3}{4}$	Tinned Vegetables <i>or</i>
Marmite	$\frac{1}{2}$	Tinned Tomatoes $5\frac{1}{2}$ oz.
Salt	$\frac{1}{4}$	
Pepper	$\frac{1}{100}$ th	
Mustard	$\frac{1}{100}$ th	
Pickles	$\frac{3}{7}$ th	Sauce $\frac{1}{6}$ th (fluid) oz.
EXTRAS		
Tobacco <i>or</i> Cigarettes	2 ozs.	Once weekly.
Matches	2 boxes	" "
Rum		On medical advice when au-
<i>or</i>		thorized by G.O.C.
Cocoa (1 pint) <i>or</i> Tea (1 pint) @		
@ Condiments		
Tea—Tea	$\frac{1}{6}$ th oz.	
Milk (Condensed)	$\frac{4}{5}$ th oz.	
Sugar	$\frac{1}{2}$ oz.	
Cocoa—Cocoa	$\frac{1}{4}$ oz.	
Milk (Condensed)	$\frac{4}{5}$ th oz.	
Sugar	$\frac{1}{2}$ oz.	
Ascorbic Acid	.025 grams	As necessary on medical advice.

**Stratford**  
**Signal Instructions**

**1. Use of existing civil facilities.**

Signal Communications between Force Headquarters and the War Office and between parts of the force will be, in the first place, through civil channels. Immediately on arrival at destination contact should be made with the local telegraph authorities and arrangements should be made for the disposal of telegrams.

The following telegraphic addresses will be used by the three parts of the force:—

548	STRATFORCE	(followed by the place name)
547	CONVERT	( " " " " )
512	OUTLOOK	( " " " " )

The commander of each part of the force should register his telegraphic address with the local telegraph authorities and arrange for the delivery to him of all incoming telegrams bearing this address or for their collection if necessary. He should arrange also for telegrams to be accepted addressed to other parts of the force. Telegrams to the War Office will be addressed "Troopers, London".

Arrangements should be made by each commander for any telephone connections required. The telephone numbers of all connections so taken up should be circulated throughout the force.

**2. Wireless Communications with the U.K.**

A portable wireless set is provided for use by Force Headquarters as an emergency link with the War Office. This set will work with a station at CATTERICK which will operate on the schedule shown in Annexure "A". Immediately on arrival at destination the set at Force Headquarters will open up communication with CATTERICK using frequencies in accordance with the schedule at Annexure "A".

A wireless set with H.Q. AVONFORCE will also operate with CATTERICK on the same schedule. Emergency communication can thus be established between STRATFORCE and AVONFORCE, but this should be used only when other means fail in order that the more important channels to the U.K. may be made full use of.

The CATTERICK station will be the directing station.

Emergency communication with the U.K. may also be obtained at times through H.M. Ships, by wireless and by destroyer letter service.

In the event of the force at either 512 or 547 being completely out of touch with Force Headquarters, emergency wireless communication can be established between those places and the War Office through the CATTERICK station, working on the Schedule at Annexure "A" as far as it lies within the frequency range of the No. 11 Wireless Set.

A set at each of 512 and 547 will be set aside for this purpose and will keep listening watch daily for sufficient periods to become familiar with working conditions.

Call signs of the stations affected by this instruction will be:—

Catterick	ZHV
Force H.Q. STRATFORCE	CJX
Force H.Q. AVONFORCE	VQY
512	VQX
547	ZHW

### 3. Wireless Communication with the Force.

Wireless Sets No. 11 have been provided for the use between the parts of the force. Call signs for these sets will be:—

Force H.Q. STRATFORCE	VVG
512	VVE
547	VVC

Frequencies suitable for use within the force are allotted in Annexure "B". The O.C. Brigade Signals should draw up schedules of working based on the details given in Annexure "B". A large number of spare frequencies are provided to permit of avoiding interference.

### 4. General notes on Wireless in High Latitudes.

#### (a) *Difficulty of Wireless Communication.*

All the wireless links referred to in these instructions cover great ranges in relation to the light portable sets used. Communication will present great difficulties and will be slow. Deliberate jamming by enemy stations is probable. All wireless operators must be prepared to spend infinite time and patience in getting their messages through. In the interests of security wireless discipline must be rigidly enforced.

**(b) Propagation of Wireless Waves.**

A guide to the most suitable frequencies for use over various distances is shown at Annexure "A"2. These frequencies have been found from practical experience to be sufficiently accurate for use as a guide. There may be discrepancies between these figures and figures which would be deduced from S.T. Vol. II, Part II, 1936 Supplement "Skip Distance Graphs for Short Wave Signalling," which were produced from calculations and should be treated with reserve.

In high latitudes in the summer months, skip distances on all frequencies are relatively small, and the attenuation on any frequency is relatively higher. Hence for satisfactory communication, frequencies higher than those used in normal altitudes must be employed. In the winter months the opposite is the case, owing to the reduced daylight. Skip distances become greater and the attenuation on all frequencies decreases. It is only during the equinox periods that conditions may be considered as resembling those encountered in normal latitudes.

In high latitudes in the summer months "fade outs" may be experienced on higher frequencies. Signals will be found to disappear completely and may not reappear again for up to 6 hours. The phenomena does not occur very frequently. Intervals of 27 days are general. The use of a much higher frequency may effect a cure, but generally there is no cure.

**(c) Condensation.**

Many troubles may be caused by condensation in low temperatures. Equipment should, if possible, be kept warm. If this is impossible, personnel must be forbidden to wash or cook near the equipment. This is to avoid moisture forming on the cold metal and freezing subsequently. If this happens on components of a transmitter or receiver it will probably render the instrument useless. Moisture forming on commutators of machines may form a layer of ice and prevent the brushes making contact.

**(d) Batteries.**

Charged accumulators will not freeze in cold temperatures although the A.H. capacity may decrease as much as 20%. If, however, cells are left in a discharged condition overnight in low temperatures the



electrolyte will freeze. If this happens, cells must be thawed out *slowly*.

Glacier ice (not snow) will produce water for topping up. The suitability of water for batteries may be tested by adding a 10% Silver Nitrate Solution to a sample (not to the battery). If the solution remains clear, the water is sufficiently good to be used in the accumulator.

The voltage of dry batteries decreases as the temperature falls. Batteries can be restored by warming gently.

**(e) Charging Engines.**

Trouble will be experienced in starting small engines in cold weather as the oil becomes very "gummy" and it may be found impossible to turn the engine. Engines will, therefore, have to be warmed with a blow lamp before they can be turned. The thinnest grade of oil should be used. It is preferable to start the engine in a warmed room.

Carburetor fires may occur after the engine has been started. The outside of the carburetor should be wiped dry after "flooding" to reduce the chance of fire by "spitting back." Fire extinguishers should be kept handy.

**(f) Earths.**

Clean ice or snow does not constitute an earth; nor is it easy to get a good earth connection in frozen ground. The alternative of a counterpoise is a more satisfactory solution.

**Annexure "A" 1**

Schedule of hours of watch and frequencies which will be in operation at the CATTERICK station, call sign ZHV, from date of sailing of STRATFORCE.

- NOTES:—(a) This schedule will remain in force until amended by orders issued from the directing station, ZHV.
- (b) CJX and VQY will keep continuous watch on the hours and frequencies shown in this schedule, from the time of arrival at destination until further orders are issued from the directing station ZHV.
- (c) At Annexure "A"2 is a table showing the hours during which communication is likely to be obtained over various distances.

Hours (G.M.T.)	Frequencies Kc/s.
2359—0030	5160
0030—0200	3560
0200—0230	5160
0230—0300	3560
0300—0330	5160
0330—0400	3560
0400—0600	3560
0600—0800	5160
0800—1000	7010
1000—1100	12440
1100—1200	7010
1200—1300	12440
1300—1400	7010
1400—1500	12440
1500—1600	7010
1600—1800	7010
1800—1900	5160
1900—2000	7010
2000—2100	5160
2100—2200	7010
2200—2300	5160
2300—2359	7010

**Annexure "A"2**

Table covering 24 hours showing the frequencies on which communication is most likely to be obtained with CATTERICK ZHV, by stations at various distances from it, working on the schedule at Annexure A.1.

Times (G.M.T.)	Station at 1200 miles	Station at 900 miles	Station at 600 miles
2359—0200	5160	5160	3560
0200—0400	5160	5160	3560
0400—0600	3560	3560	3560
0600—0800	5160	5160	5160
0800—1000	7010	7010	7010
1000—1200	12440	12440	7010
1200—1400	12440	12440	7010
1400—1600	12440	12440	7010
1600—1800	7010	7010	7010
1800—2000	7010	7010	5160
2000—2200	7010	7010	5160
2200—2359	7010	7010	5160

**Annexure "B"**

**Allotment of Frequencies for No. 11 Sets H.P.  
for Use within Stratforce**

Approximate Times G.M.T.	100 miles						300 miles						Seasons
	Kc/s. 4285	Kc/s. 4300	Kc/s. 4320	Kc/s. 4360	Kc/s. 4380	Kc/s. 4420	Kc/s. 5060	Kc/s. 4855	Kc/s. 4840	Kc/s. 4780	Kc/s. 5120	Kc/s. 5180	
2000 hrs.—0200 hrs.							@ 4285	@ 4440	@ 4420	@ 4320	@ 4330	@ 4300	March to April
0200 hrs.—0800 hrs.	4285	4300	4320	4330	4420	4440							
0800 hrs.—1600 hrs.	7050	7140	7250	7310	7460	7480	7460	7480	7310	7250	7140	7050	
1600 hrs.—2000 hrs.	5060	5120	5180	5220	5300	5400	7460	7480	7310	7250	7140	7050	
Mdt.—0400 hrs.	4285	4300	4320	4330	4420	4440	4855	5120	5180	5400	5220	5300	May to July
0400 hrs.—1800 hrs.	7050	7140	7250	7310	7480	7460	} 7460						
1800 hrs.—Mdt.	4855	5120	5180	5220	5300	5400							

## Appendix "D"

## Special Scale of Explosives

<i>Item</i>	<i>Store</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>Total</i>
1	Detonators No. 27	2000	2000	500	500	5,000
2	Fuze Instantaneous detonating TNT MK.III feet	4000	4000	800	800	9,600
3	Fuze Safety No. 1, Mk.I or Mk.II feet	2304	2304	768	768	6,144
4	Detonators electric No. 8 Commercial	400	400	200	200	1,200
5	Guncotton Dry Primers Field 1-oz.Mk.II or Mk. <sup>o</sup> I.*	2100	2100	960	960	6,120
6	Guncotton Wet Slabs Field 1-lb. Mk.I or 15-oz. Mk.I	224	224	224	224	896
7	Igniters Safety fuze percussion					30
8	Ammonal, Cartridge packed tons	11	11	1	1	24
9	Matches fuzes safety boxes	240	240	120	120	720

The following markings will be on packages:—

- A. Bright red circle 3" diameter. Black 1 within circle.
- B. Bright red circle 3" diameter. Black 2 within circle.
- C. Bright blue circle 3" diameter. Black 1 within circle.
- D. Bright blue circle 3" diameter. Black 2 within circle.

*No package should exceed 80 lbs. in weight.*

## DOCUMENT NO. 2

## MATTERS AFFECTING THE PAYMENT OF OFFICERS AND OTHER RANKS AFTER EMBARKATION

[Although the Stratforce Plan itself was undated, it may be assumed that it had been prepared long before its discovery by the German troops. More definite evidence as to the time is the following document, found with the Stratforce Plan, which was stamped April 5, 1940.]

\* An unintelligible mark, somewhat like a degree sign, precedes "I" in the original document.

**MATTERS AFFECTING THE PAYMENT OF OFFICERS AND  
OTHER RANKS AFTER EMBARKATION**

The following notes on Pay matters are published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

**Other Ranks****(A) *Payments to.***

1. Made on acquittance rolls from date of embarkation.
2. Made as often as necessary, and based on *net* rate of pay shown in soldier's A.B. 64.
3. Recorded in soldier's A.B. 64 by paying Officer who will *sign* entry therein.
4. Will be signed for by the soldier on acquittance rolls.

**(B) *Funds***

Demands for cash will be made on A.F.N. 1488, a book of which may be obtained from Paymaster. Renewals will only be made on production of stub of old book.

Accounting is simple and is confined to two forms, viz:—

Acquittance Rolls (A.F.N. 1513), and  
Company Commander's Account (A.F. N 1513A)

**(C) *Acquittance Rolls***

1. To be serially numbered.
2. Kept in duplicate.
3. Total entered in A.F. N 1531A.
4. Original to Paymaster as soon as payment is made—duplicate retained.
5. *Separate rolls to be made out for personnel of each regiment or Corps.*

**(D) *Company Commander's Account***

1. Kept on A.F. N 1531A in duplicate.
2. Closed at end of each month.
3. Original to Paymaster—duplicate retained.

**Advance to Officers**

1. Advance Books (in pads of 25) may be obtained on written application (first issue only) from Paymaster.

Units may find it convenient to make one written application on behalf of all officers for the first issue. In that event the application should take the following form:—

“Please supply Army Forms W.3241 as under:—

Name of Unit .....

.....

Rank	Name and Unit	I certify that this is the only application that has been, or will be made by me for a first issue of A.F. W 3241.
------	---------------	--

.....  
(Officer's Signature)

.....

.....

The above was signed in my presence.

Date .....

Officer Commanding .....

2. Subsequent requirements of A.F. W 3241 will be met from the same source on officer producing stump of old book.
- 3.\* The Paymaster's office will be open for the transaction of cash business during such hours as may be determined upon by Force Commander, and published by him in orders.

\* This “3” is omitted in the original, obviously through an oversight.

4. The maximum amount of the advance, and the number of advances in any one calendar month will be as follows:—

2/Lieut.	3 advances of £ 4 or equivalent.
Officers below Field Rank	3 advances of £ 5 or equivalent.
Officer of and above Field Rank	3 advances of £10 or equivalent.
5. Officers will be especially careful to ensure that before presenting A.F.W. 5247 for payment the form is completed in all respects. *This is of importance in the Officers' own interests.*

### DOCUMENT NO. 3

#### 148TH INFANTRY BRIGADE OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO. 1

[Operation Instruction No. 1 for the 148th Infantry Brigade was issued on April 6, 1940, two days after Amendment Sheet No. 1 had been annexed to the Stratforce Plan. This document contains details for the advance on point 547, which is one of the three locations designated only by numbers in the original Plan.]

**SECRET**

**6 APR. 40**

**COPY NO. 1**

#### 148TH INFANTRY BRIGADE—OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO. 1

##### 1. General policy.

The intention of STRATFORCE is to effect a landing at 512, 547 and 548, and to occupy these ports with a view to denying them to Germany.

It is anticipated that our assistance will be welcomed by the inhabitants, but the decision as to whether or not to land will rest with the R.Navy.

##### 2. Intention.

It is the intention of 547 to effect a landing as directed by the R.Navy and to place the following in a state of defence:

- (a) The harbour and quayside.
- (b) The aerodrome at SOLA.
- (c) The seaplane station 1½ miles \* North of SOLA.

### 3. Possible Enemy Action.

The main opposition can only be expected in the first instance from enemy air action, which might be directed against the force while actually landing.

In such eventuality the landing would be covered by the R.Navy. As soon as troops have disembarked they will be responsible for their own protection, and it is essential that, whether the enemy is active or not, troops are moved off from the quayside to their Bn assembly areas with the least possible delay.

It is also possible that while a landing can be effected at the harbour, the enemy may forestall our [one] occupation of the aerodrome, in which case immediate action will be taken to capture the aerodrome.

### 4. Assembly Areas.

In whatever order the force may be put ashore, unit Commanders will assemble their Bns as follows:

Bde H.Q. and 55 Fd.Coy.R.E.	PARK immed. S. of CATHEDRAL.
8th Foresters.	HOSPITAL.
5th Leicesters.	GAS WORKS.

Plns. should be moved off from the quayside as complete. As soon as Bn H.Q. are established a liaison officer will be sent to Bde.H.Q.

### 5. Aerodrome and Seaplane Base. 8th Foresters.

8th Foresters will be prepared to move at once to SOLA without waiting for transport or stores. It is of vital importance that the aerodrome should be secured on the day as the landing takes place.

\* An illegible syllable has been crossed out here in the original document.



A small rear party can be left at the Bn assembly point to guard such stores as cannot be carried on the man during the march. These stores will be brought out to SOLA as soon as Transport can be collected.

On arrival at SOLA at least one Coy must be in position continuously from which fire can be directed on to the Aerodrome.

At the Seaplane Base it will probably be sufficient to arrange for continuous observation, provided communications are good and there is a reserve at hand.

**6. Harbour Guards. 1/5th Leicesters.**

Without recon. the number of picquets required for local defence cannot be estimated. It is intended to keep the posts at a minimum and maintain the remainder of the Bn as a reserve to the force.

**7. A/A Action.**

Although sketches are available showing hostile aircraft, it is a matter of experience to distinguish friend from foe in the air.

The following order will be observed throughout the force.

No fire will be opened against any aircraft unless

- (a) Hostile markings are visible.
- (b) The aircraft is taking hostile action.

**8. Administration.**

- (a) Rations (boxes of 12 rations) to be carried ashore and taken to Bn assembly areas.
- (b) Small baggage parties to be retailed and left at the quayside to collect together unit stores as they are off loaded.
- (c) Captain Wilson to arrange the i n r e \* of transport.  
Capt. Tandy “ “ “ purchase of rations, and the siting of a supply store shed.  
S.M.O. to arrange with civil hospital authorities.

\* The word “line” is crossed out here in the original document.

- (d) Capt.Larsen to work in the first instance with Capt.Tandy and Capt.Wilson. Additional interpreters will be obtained as soon as possible.
- (e) Staff Captain to make enquiries regarding billeting facilities.

**Barnard Castle.**

Major.\*  
Brigade Major, 148th (NL) Infantry  
Brigade.

*Distribution.*

	Copy No.
1/5th Leicesters.	1.
8th Foresters.	2.
55 Fd.Coy.R.E.	3.
Brigadier Phillips.	4.
Brigade Commander.	5.
Brigade Major	6.
File.	7.
War Diary (2)	8 and 9.

**DOCUMENT NO. 4**

**EIGHTH BATTALION, THE SHERWOOD FORESTERS,  
OPERATION ORDERS**

[The Stratforce Plan provides that the designation 547 and the other numbered places would not be identified by name until after the embarkation of the troops. The following document is the first in which one of the destinations is actually named. This secret order was drawn up by the Battalion Adjutant aboard the cruiser *Glasgow* on April 7. The Norwegian port of Stavanger is mentioned in paragraph 9. It is apparent from the document published above that the Foresters were to occupy the aerodrome at Sola, while the Leicesters were to take over the harbor of Stavanger. The following order is significant chiefly because it proves

\* The signature is illegible. Cf. facsimile of original document.

that the troops who were supposed to occupy various places in Norway were already on the way on April 7.]

**Secret**

**April 7th, 1940.**

**8/SF/SY/13**  
**Copy No.**

**8TH BATT'N. THE SHERWOOD FORESTERS OPERATION  
ORDERS**

**1. General Policy.**

The intention of the Stratford Forces is to effect a landing at 512, 547, and 548 and to occupy these ports with a view to denying them to Germany.

It is anticipated that our assistance will be welcomed by the inhabitants but the decision as to whether or not to land will rest with the Royal Navy.

**2. Intention.**

It is the intention of 547 to effect a landing as directed by the Royal Navy and to place the following in a state of defence.

- (a) The harbour and quayside
- (b) The aerodrome at SOLA
- (c) The seaplane station 1½ miles north of SOLA

**3. Possible Enemy Action.**

The main opposition can only be expected in the first instance from enemy air action, which might be directed against the force while actually landing.

In such eventuality the landing will be covered by the Royal Navy. As soon as troops have disembarked they will be responsible for their own protection, and it is essential that, whether the enemy is active or not, troops are moved off from the quay side to their Bn. Assembly Area with the least possible delay.

It is also possible that while a landing can be effected at the harbour, the enemy may forestall our occupation of the aerodrome in which case immediate action will be taken to capture the aerodrome.

4. Special instructions have been issued for DISEMBARKATION.

**5. Assembly Area.**

(a) 8 Foresters—Hospital

(b) Bde H.Q. —Park immediately south of Cathedral

The Bn. will move from the quayside by complete platoons. Bn H.Qs. will be established at Hospital in first instance. Lt. R. Bradley will act as Liaison Officer and will report to Brigade when Bn. Headquarters has been established.

**6. Aerodrome and Seaplane Base.**

8 Foresters will be prepared to move at once to Sola without waiting Transport or Stores.

**7. Order of March from Assembly Area.**

"D" Coy. Adv. Gd. to Bn.

"C" Coy. Bn. HQ.

No. 1. Platoon.

No. 2. Platoon, plus three Brens and Carrier Pl. personnel.

No. 5. Platoon.

No. 6. Platoon.

"A" Coy.

"B" Coy.

8. (a) The AERODROME will be secured by the Adv. Gd. Coy.

(b) "C" Coy. will establish an observation post on the SEAPLANE BASE  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles NORTH of SOLA.

(c) Final Dispositions for the security of the AERODROME at SOLA, and the SEAPLANE BASE NORTH of SOLA will be made as soon as possible after the seizure of same has been effected.

9. 1/5th Leicesters are reserve Bn. to the force and are to occupy the PORT of *STAVANGER*.

**10. A/A Action.**

Bren Guns will be sited and mounted for A.A. action as quickly as possible on the securing of the AERODROME and SEAPLANE BASE.

The following order will be observed throughout:

No fire will be opened against any aircraft unless (a) Hostile markings are visible. (b) The aircraft are taking hostile action.

11. GREAT CARE AND RESTRAINT will be exercised if any encounter with the INHABITANTS of the country.

Resort to force in the form of using lethal weapons will only be used in the event of extreme necessity.

**12. Administration.**

(a) Lieut. and Q.M. Halam is detailed as baggage Officer. This officer will also be responsible for the Brigade Staff baggage.

2/Lt. Blackburn is detailed as Assistant Baggage Officer.

No. 3. Platoon will act as Baggage Party.

All Baggage and Unit Stores will be collected and taken to a Rendezvous to be selected by the Baggage Officer.

(b) The Medical Officer will liaise with the M.O. of the Leicesters for the purpose of making arrangements with the Civil Medical Authorities and proceed with the Unit of SOLA.

(c) **Ammunition**

50 Rounds bandolier packed will be carried by all Ranks armed with a rifle. Bren Guns: Each with 750 Rounds loaded into magazines of 25 Rounds *each* distributed between the personnel of the sections.

(d) **Rations.**

A haversack ration will be issued by the Royal Navy before leaving the ship.

One days emergency rations issued to all Ranks today, these emergency rations will NOT be opened until ordered by the Commanding Officer. Water bottles will be filled before leaving this ship.

(e) **Dress.**

All Ranks will parade in fighting order wearing leather jerkins and steel helmet. The greatcoat will be carried rolled and fastened with pack straps.

(f) **Kitbags and Packs.**

These will be labelled with the mans name, platoon and Company and will be collected under Company arrangements and stacked as ordered by the Royal Navy.

(g) **Bn. Tools, and Field Work Stores.**

All Unit digging tools and allotted sandbags will be sent forward by the first available transport. The Quartermaster is made absolutely responsible for this.

**13. Intercommunication.**

Two signallers with bicycles to each Company.

Adjutant.\*

Aboard  
H.M.S. GLASGOW.

**DISTRIBUTION.**

C.O.	Captain H.M.S. Glasgow
2 in C.	Commander H.M.S. Glasgow
Adjutant.	
O.C. "HQ" Coy.	
O.C. "A" "	
O.C. "B" "	
O.C. "C" "	
O.C. "D" "	
Q.M.	
Ass. Baggage Officer (Blackburn)	

\* The signature is illegible. Cf. facsimile of original document.

Liaison Officer  
M.O.  
Signals Officer  
War Diary.

## DOCUMENT NO. 5

### STATISTICAL CHARTS CONCERNING MEN AND MATERIALS

[Editor's Note: As the three statistical charts that make up Document No. 5 are clearly reproduced in facsimile in the last half of this book, reprinting them here is not essential to either the substance or the continuity of the documental series.]

## DOCUMENT NO. 6

### THE DIARY OF AN OFFICER IN THE LEICESTERS

[Further identification of point 547 as being Stavanger is given in the following diary of an officer in the Leicesters.]

Sat Apr. 6th	Cockfield Fell Station
Sun Apr. 7th	1000 hrs. Rosyth, on to HMS Devonshire, to go to Stavanger.
Mon Apr. 8th	1100 hrs. "All troops disembark at the double." Dinner in dockyard. Cheer departure of ship. 1330 hrs. March 8 miles (uphill) to Camp 3 beyond Dunfermline.
Tues Apr. 9th	Easy day. Foot washing in stream.
Wed. Apr. 10th	Another easy day, with some sports.
Thurs Apr. 11th	Easy morning. Pay in the afternoon. Visit to Dunfermline allowed.
Friday Apr. 12th	Morning Rout. March afternoon "Evening leave again" cancelled at once "Stand by" Evening orders to move.
Saturday Apr. 13th	0810 March out of Camp to Rosyth dock, onto lighters, on to S. S. Orion. Confusion over stores, loaded separately. On board (after 4 attempts to come alongside) about 1700 hrs. Luxury.





**GROUP B**  
**CIPHER TELEGRAMS (DECODED)**  
**FROM THE RECORDS OF THE BRITISH CONSUL**  
**IN NARVIK**



## DOCUMENT NO. 7

**FROM THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY TO THE BRITISH CONSUL  
IN NARVIK**

[The documents reproduced in this section show that British espionage in Norway had begun before the end of 1939 and was continued with ever-increasing momentum until early in April, 1940. The British naturally believed that they had gathered sufficient information to effect their proposed occupation when they launched their activities on April 7. The German counter-action struck just in time to frustrate the elaborate plan.

The first document in this section is an inquiry from the Admiralty to the Consul in Narvik concerning quays and aerodromes in northern Norway.]

**From Admiralty****To British Consul, Narvik 20065**

British Consular Officer, Narvik, repeated Naval Attaché, Oslo, from D.N.I. Please report by telegraph harbor facilities of the port of Narvik including following details:—

- (a) length of quays
- (b) depth of water alongside
- (c) height of quays above high water
- (d) number of cranes or other facilities for unloading ships
- (e) number and dimensions any transit sheds
- (f) number of rail approaches to quays
- (g) whether there is any flat ground in the immediate neighbourhood harbour
- (h) dimensions of reported aerodromes SKATORRA and BARDU-FOSS
- (i) whether there are any roads to these aerodromes.

Use great discretion in making your investigations and repeat your telegraphic reports to Naval Attaché, OSLO.

T.O.R. 0930/30 T.O.O. 2018/29/12/39

**DOCUMENT NO. 8****FROM THE BRITISH CONSUL IN NARVIK TO THE BRITISH  
CONSUL IN TROMSÖ**

[Shortly after receiving the above inquiry, the Consul in Narvik sent a telegram to his colleague in Tromsö. The telegram passed on the Admiralty's desire to obtain information about the two aerodromes at Skatorra and Bardufoss.]

**To Consul Cumming, British Consulate, Tromsø 20920**

Can you give me following information regarding reported aerodromes at SKATORRA and BARDUFOSS, approximate dimensions, whether any roads lead to them, are both available for land machines, distance from TROMSØ and NARVIK. Please treat as extremely confidential. GIBBS.

T.O.O. 1724/31/12/39

**DOCUMENT NO. 9****FROM THE BRITISH CONSUL IN TROMSÖ TO THE BRITISH  
CONSUL IN NARVIK**

[The Consul in Tromsö celebrated New Year's Day by collecting the "strictly confidential" information that had been requested. On January 2 he transmitted his findings by telegram back to Narvik.]

**From Tromsø**

**To British Consul, Narvik 44173**

Your 1724 of 31st. December. SKATTÖYRA is a Norwegian naval seaplane base situated on TROMSØ island about 4 miles north by *road* from the center of town. There is no landing ground for land machines and the hangars are not yet completed. Seaplanes lying at mooring buoys. Hangars erections is to accommodate 16 seaplanes.

BARDUFOSS is a Norwegian military air station situated some 45 miles northward of NARVIK by road and about 80 miles southward of TROMSØ by road. Dimensions landing ground unknown.

T.O.R. 1430/2 T.O.O. 1010/2/1/40

**DOCUMENT NO. 10****FROM THE BRITISH CONSUL IN NARVIK TO THE BRITISH  
LEGATION IN OSLO AND TO THE ADMIRALTY**

[Because of the prompt reply from his colleague in Tromsö, the Consul in Narvik was able to send the required data on that same day both to the Admiralty in London and to the British Legation in Oslo, which was thus directly involved in espionage.]

The information gathered by the British Consuls revealed that certain quays were not suitable for the unloading of stores but were excellent for the disembarkation of troops.]

**To British Legation, Oslo****To Admiralty, London 22280**

Admiralty (for D.N.I.) repeated to Naval Attaché OSLO your 2018 29. December.

***Ore Quay***

- (a) about 1200 feet
- (b) 26 feet at low water
- (c) 30 feet at high water; not suitable for discharging cargo but troops could be landed there.

***Harbour Jetty***

- (a) 400 feet
- (b) 29 feet at low water outside, only 18 feet inside jetty
- (c) 8 feet at high water
- (d) none
- (e) 2 store sheds 45 by 8 yards and 50 by 8 yards, respectively, 2 floors each.
- (f) single line passes across inshore end of quay.

***Fagernes Quay***

- (a) 550 feet
- (b) 21 feet at low water
- (c) 6 feet at high water

- (d) One 20 ton electric crane
- (e) 190 by 20 metres, 2 floors
- (f) double line alongside ship. 2 separate single lines connect them to main line also sidings abreast quay.
- (g) no.

(h) SKATORRA is naval seaplane base on TROMSØ Island 4 miles north of town by road. No landing ground there. Hangars to accommodate 16 seaplanes not yet completed, planes lying at buoys. BARDUFØSS is military air station 45 miles northward of NARVIK by road and 80 miles southward of TROMSØ by road; exact dimensions unknown but reported to be not less than 600 metres each way.

Understand railway tunnels do not permit transport of aeroplanes.

Information from British Consuls at NARVIK and TROMSØ.

T.O.O. 1929/2/1/40

## DOCUMENT NO. 11

### FROM THE ADMIRALTY TO THE BRITISH CONSUL IN NARVIK

[The Director of Naval Intelligence in the Admiralty apparently was satisfied with the information sent him on January 2. On the following day he asked for details concerning the electrical power supply in Narvik. It took the Consul in Narvik only another day to satisfy the Admiralty's thirst for knowledge even in regard to such remote questions.]

**From Admiralty**

**To British Consul, Narvik 11201**

British Consul, Narvik from Admiralty (D.N.I.) Request immediate details of NARVIK electric power supply including voltage and frequency

T.O.R. 1930/3

T.O.O. 1337/3/1/40

**DOCUMENT NO. 12****FROM THE BRITISH CONSUL IN NARVIK TO THE ADMIRALTY****To Admiralty London 23471**

Admiralty (for D.N.I.) your 1337 3rd. January. 2 water power stations for town supply: (i) NYGAARDS station 8 miles E.N.E., 10 thousand horse power. (ii) HAAKVIKDAL 3 miles South, 3 thousand horsepower, also ore Company reserve Diesel plant 10 thousand horse power. All 50 periods and 220 volts.

Norwegian railway also worked from NYGAARDS Station except in drought when power supplied from PORTUS Station, Sweden.

T.O.O. 1913/4/1/40

**DOCUMENT NO. 13****FROM THE BRITISH CONSUL IN NARVIK TO THE ADMIRALTY  
AND TO THE BRITISH LEGATION IN OSLO**

[From quays, aerodromes and electrical power the subject soon turned to the movements of ships and troops. In each case, the British diplomats in Norway got the information requested with remarkable speed and thoroughness. It also gradually became more apparent that the British Legation in Oslo was the espionage center of Scandinavia.]

**To Admiralty London 30258****To British Legation, Oslo**

Admiralty (for D.N.I.) repeated to Naval Attaché Oslo. Following movements of Norwegian troops have taken place 12th Jan. 1000 [10 o'clock] G.M.T. about 400 troops landed from mail steamer 13th Jan. 0200 [2 o'clock] G.M.T. 2 steamers about 1500 tons called redistributed the troops they were carrying and proceeded to the Northward, numbers unknown. All troops came from the South.

T.O.O. 1225/13/1/40

**DOCUMENT NO. 14**

**FROM THE BRITISH CONSUL IN NARVIK TO THE BRITISH  
CONSUL IN TROMSÖ**

**To Consul Cumming, British Consulate, Tromsø 30332**

Can you inform me whether any ships passed Tromsø this morning  
Saturday with Norwegian troops.—British Consul, Narvik

T.O.O. 1529/13/1/40

**DOCUMENT NO. 15**

**FROM THE BRITISH CONSUL IN TROMSÖ TO THE BRITISH  
CONSUL IN NARVIK**

**From Tromsø**

**To British Consul, Narvik 14403**

Your 1529 [telegram] 13th January I have no information about  
this and personally saw nothing during daylight hours. There is how-  
ever a constant stream of troops northward by mail steamer.

T.O.R. 2100/13      T.O.O. 2024/13/1/40

**DOCUMENT NO. 16**

**FROM THE BRITISH CONSUL IN BERGEN TO THE BRITISH  
CONSUL IN NARVIK**

**From British Consul Bergen G.T.C.**

**To British Consul, Narvik**

Reference Memo N. I. (u) Para 54 (1). Please report by telegraph  
direct to D.N.I. Present position of Norwegian War Vessels in your  
area and also future movements.

T.O.R. 1601/3/4.      T.O.O. 1330/3/4/40



**DOCUMENT NO. 17****FROM THE ADMIRALTY TO THE BRITISH CONSUL IN NARVIK****From Admiralty G.T.C.****To British Consul, Narvik**

Reference Memo N. I. (u), Para 54 (1). Please report by telegraph present position Norwegian War Vessels in your area and also future movements.

T.O.R. 0845/3/4/40.

T.O.O. 1616/2

**DOCUMENT NO. 18****FROM THE ADMIRALTY TO THE BRITISH CONSUL IN NARVIK**

[When at the beginning of April the British finally decided to strike, they considered their diplomatic staff in Norway as not quite sufficient. Consequently the Admiralty telegraphed the consul in Narvik that he had been relieved of his duties and that "for special reasons" a Mr. Roseberry would take his place. Roseberry would fly to his post on April 8, the day set for the launching of British activities all along the Norwegian coast. The "special reasons" require no explanation.

The fact that the Admiralty and not the Foreign Office appointed the new consul to Narvik is further proof of the military nature of Roseberry's mission.]

**From Admiralty 97032****To British Consul, Narvik**

From admiralty. N. C. L. Roseberry has been appointed to Narvik as British Consul. He leaves United Kingdom by air on the 8th April. N. Roseberry has been appointed Consul at Narvik for special reasons. His appointment does not reflect upon the manner in which you have hitherto performed your duties, which has given Complete Satisfaction and you should continue to take charge of Naval Control Duties at Narvik.

T.O.R. 0930/7/4.

T.O.O. 1925/6/4/40



**GROUP C**

**ESPIONAGE INSTRUCTIONS**  
**ADDRESSED TO THE BRITISH CONSUL**  
**IN NARVIK**  
**BY THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE**  
**IN THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY**



## DOCUMENT NO. 19

**LETTER FROM THE ASSISTANT BRITISH NAVAL ATTACHÉ  
IN STOCKHOLM TO THE BRITISH CONSUL IN NARVIK**

[Judging by its style and content, the following letter was certainly never intended for publication. The writer instructs the Consul in Narvik to send an agent to Tromsö as soon as possible to obtain answers to a certain list of questions. The list was an urgent order from the Admiralty. The thrilling romance of the Secret Service is here described at its best. The messenger is to hide the document — which “will provide much fun and jollity for the long winter evenings” for the Consul in Narvik — under his shirt.]

**British Legation,  
Stockholm.**

**14th February, 1940**

Dear Consul-Captain—

This is firstly to introduce my confidential clerk, Maxton, whom I recommend to your mercy—

He brings with him a questionnaire which will provide much fun and jollity for the long winter evenings.

The orders from the Admiralty are that this is to be got through jildi jildi regardless of expense. I suggest, therefore, that you send one of your bright boys on to Tromsö with his packet and that he should wait there for the answer and bring it back to you. Then you will send Smith, e.g., down to me with your answer and Tromsö's, carrying the envelope under his shirt, for the fact of carrying a letter must not be known. In the meantime you will be obtaining a Swedish visa for Smith, e. g. for aller et retour and if there is any trouble about this please let me know by telegram—the reason for the visa to be recreation of course—and it should be valid for at least four days as the journey takes two.

I am instructing Maxton to obtain information as to question 11 on his way. I rather think that Oslo has the answer to 13 but anything you know to confirm may be useful—

How you are going to answer the others is best known to yourself but don't get yourself shot if you can help it.

Best love to you all, Maxton will give you all the news.

Yours

John Poland

May I have my rulers back, please? They are urgently needed here.

## DOCUMENT NO. 20

### ENCLOSURE FOUND WITH THE ABOVE LETTER

[The enclosure to Mr. Poland's amusing letter is directed not to the Consul in Narvik but to the Senior Naval Control Service Officer. This fact shows the close tie that existed between the British consular offices and the Admiralty. In fact, the positions of Consul and Senior Naval Control Service Officer were probably both held by the same man. Indeed, the Admiralty was anxious that the gentleman "should not in any way compromise his position or arouse local suspicion." However, it is added that a number of the questions asked could be answered "during the course of ordinary work." The "ordinary work" of a consul does not include research in matters of a military nature.]

Admiralty.

### REFERENCE SHEET.

From ..... Director of Naval Intelligence .....	to Senior Naval Control Service Officer, Narvik.
Dated ..... 31st January ..... 19... 40...	
Information required, or notified.	

Replies to the questions in the attached questionnaire are requested as soon as possible. It would be convenient if items of information were forwarded, with reference to the relevant paragraphs, as they are obtained. It should be emphasised that no attempt to gather information should in any way compromise your position or arouse local sus-

picion. Much of that concerning port facilities, which is more urgently required, would no doubt become accessible during the course of ordinary work.

(Sgd.) GEOFFREY COOKE  
for D.N.I.

## DOCUMENT NO. 21

### INFORMATION REQUIRED ON NARVIK

[The questionnaire sent from Stockholm by Mr. Poland concerned itself with a large number of military details about the town and vicinity of Narvik. Question 10 again raises the point of landing troops. Question 11 is a request for detailed information as to *where the railway from Narvik to the Swedish frontier could best be sabotaged.*]

#### Information Required on Narvik.

1. Can up-to-date and detailed plans of the town and port be obtained locally?
2. It was reported 2 years ago that considerable port development was to be expected in the near future. Information as to how far, if at all, this development has proceeded is required, together with available details regarding plans for the future.
3. What is the present population of Narvik?  
10,000
4. Detailed information about the facilities, lay-out and present or proposed use of the Naval Base at RAMSUND is particularly required.
5. Details are required of the exact repair and other facilities available at the LUOSSAVARA-KERUNAVADRA A/B (L.K.A.B.) yard.
6. Information is required regarding coal supplies:—
  - (a) Number and location of stores.
  - (b) Present or normal stocks.
  - (c) Maximum storage capacity.

7. Information is required regarding oil supplies:—
  - (a) Nature of oil.
  - (b) Number and location of tanks.
  - (c) Present or normal stocks.
  - (d) Maximum storage capacity.
8. What signal facilities (telephone, telegraph, etc.) are available?
9. With regard to the defences of Narvik:—
  - (a) Can you confirm that 5 guns are placed above RAM-SUND, near the entrance to the OFOTEN FJORD, and state exact positions?
  - (b) Can you give details regarding calibre, range and arcs of fire of guns.
  - (c) Can you confirm that the defence of Narvik is one mobile battery of 4 A/A guns, Bofors type, and give details.
  - (d) Can you confirm that Narvik will be, or is, defended by a coast defence vessel with 20 cm. guns in Vest Fjord?
10. Information is required regarding coastal reconnaissance, with a view to landings, raids, etc.
11. Would you confirm that the railway between Narvik and RIKS-GRANSEN could easily be sabotaged. If so, details of the points at which it is vulnerable are required.
12. What harbour craft are available locally, particularly lighters, barges and tugs?
13. **Addendum.**

Can you confirm that there is a mine depot on the mainland at KIRKENES, and that mine-laying vessels are in the vicinity awaiting orders to establish a minefield?



**GROUP D**

**EXTRACTS FROM PAPERS IN THE  
POSSESSION OF THE FRENCH NAVAL ATTACHÉ  
IN OSLO**



**DOCUMENT NO. 22****NOTE FROM THE FRENCH NAVAL ATTACHÉ IN OSLO TO A  
CAPTAIN IN THE NAVY**

[From the very day that the Russo-Finnish conflict broke out, the French and English Governments sought to exploit it to attain one of their foremost objectives: the occupation of Scandinavia as a base for large-scale military operations against Germany. That the interest shown in Finland by the Western Powers was nothing more than pretext is clearly shown by the following note from the pen of the French Naval Attaché in Oslo.]

[Translation]

February 8, 1940

Oslo

**Note for Captain in the Navy, Chief of F. M. F. 5.**

Subject: Sending of information about Norway.

Reference: Questionnaire on the subject, No. 1/40 of January 29,  
1940

Telegrams on the subject, No. 1058 of January 26, 1940  
No. 1187 of January 31, 1940

My Memorandum, No. 44 "N" of January 30, 1940

1. I have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of your questionnaire No. 1/40 of January 29.
2. It is impossible to gather all information for an answer in Oslo. Therefore, I shall immediately travel to Trondheim and Narvik (remaining there for about eight to ten days).
3. In anticipation of the general report, which I shall make after returning from my journey, I am forwarding to you the following special information, which, together with the enclosed report of my Note No. 44 "N" of January 30, 1940, will render a feasible idea of the possible accessibility of the harbors in question and means for their evacuation.  
.....
4. ....
5. Route to Sweden.  
The request asking Norwegian army leaders to send military shipments to Finland had been advised against by everyone, in spite of

all the advantages offered by the port of Bergen for quick disembarkation, because of the later long journey by rail and the difficulties which would arise from it. In their opinion only the ports of the Fjords of Trondheim and the port of Narvik would be suitable for such operations.

6. Norway's military estimates the speed of their railroad transportation in case of war operations at 20 kilometers per hour.

7. *Miscellaneous Annotations.*

The maps of Norway, asked for in Telegram No. 1107 of January 31, 1940, were procured from our local booksellers before the arrival of your questionnaire. The purchase undertaken by different sellers could in no way have caused the least suspicion or comment. I abstained from purchasing the indicated maps of Sweden. According to the catalogue, the enclosed maps seem to correspond with those which have been published by our hydrographic service.

## DOCUMENT NO. 23

### SHIPPING FACILITIES ALONG THE TRONDHEIM FJORD

[Directly parallel to the espionage activity of the French Naval Attaché ran that of the British Consular Shipping Office, in whose branch office in Trondheim the ensuing two documents were found among papers belonging to the French Naval Attaché in Oslo. These documents comprise a fairly comprehensive survey of hundreds of miles of Norwegian coast. Of particular interest are the comments on Langsten, an "ideal place for secret landings," and on the quays at Ilsvikbugten, which are "well-suited to disembarkation of personnel."]

### SHIPPING FACILITIES ALONG THE TRONDHEIM FJORD

1. **Trondheim harbour proper.**

This harbour consists of two basins, BRATTOEREN and NYHAVEN.

*Brattoeren.* is the main harbour but only has one quay for deep water ships. There are six quays all told, each suitable for ships with

a draught of 20 to 22 feet. A quay to give a draught of 28 feet is being rapidly extended.

*Nyhaven.* is mainly a coal-importing harbour. There is only 24 feet alongside each quay.

## 2. Ports Along the Fjord.

These are FOLLEFOSS, MALM, STENKJAER, LANGSTEN, MURVIK, HOM ELVIK, BUVIK and THAMSHAVN.

*Follefoss* is 120 miles by road from Trondheim and lies off the railway. It is mainly used for wood pulp ships.

*Malm* lies 110 miles by road from Trondheim. Has one wharf equipped for the loading of iron ore and takes ships up to 8,000 tons.

*Langsten* is 50 miles from Trondheim and lies on the direct railway route to Sweden, has an excellent deep water quay. *Ideal place for secret landings.* Is often used as a wood pulp port.

*Murvik* about 20 miles from Trondheim, has a loading quay used mainly for carbide and wood pulp. Is on the direct line to Sweden, but anything going on there can easily be observed.

*Hommelvik* 15 miles east of Trondheim with 26 feet alongside. Timber exporting port.

## DOCUMENT NO. 24

### A BRITISH CONSULAR SHIPPING OFFICE REPORT ON NORWEGIAN QUAYS

British Consular Shipping Office  
Fjordgaten 25—Trondhjem  
Tel B. 6160

Question A (cont).  
IN ILSVIKBUGTEN

Kooperative Soc'y Jetty (2 hauling-off buoys)	Depth 21 ft.	Length 194 ft.
Ore * Pier (Kiskaien) (2 hauling-off buoys)	32	piles-conveyor band foot- bridge.

\* The word "quay" was crossed out here in the original document.

B.P.Oil Depot Jetty (2 hauling-off buoys)	Over 30 (?)	10 ft. (pipe line and foot- bridge)
Shell Oil Depot quay (No buoy—tankers anchor and drop stern near)	Over 30 (?)	30 ft.
Standard Oil Quay (1 hauling-off buoy for stern—ships anchor)	Over 30 (?)	150 ft.
Nordenfjeldske Quay (No buoy—tankers anchor and drop stern near)	Over 30 (?)	30 ft.

The above-mentioned 6 jetties and quays in Ilsvikbugten are well-suited to disembarkation of *personnel*—and are well protected from all but North-easterly winds—when big ships might have difficulties there.

**GROUP E**  
**DOCUMENTS FOUND AT THE**  
**NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY**  
**IN OSLO**





**DOCUMENT NO. 25****NOTE FROM THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE  
MINISTER OF STATE**

[It is obvious that the extensive British espionage activities could not long have been kept secret from the Norwegian Government, especially since much of the information was obtained through the interrogation of local Norwegian authorities. The (former) Norwegian Government failed to fulfill its duties as a neutral. It tolerated violations of Norwegian waters and encouraged British intentions to land troops. Such has been proved in preceding documents and is further substantiated by those in this section.]

[Translation]

**Foreign Ministry**

**Oslo, February 17, 1940**

**Strictly Confidential**

Cooperation between Finland and England.  
Norway's Position.

To the Minister of State:

I have the honor of informing you that the Embassy in Stockholm has stated the following in a confidential report of the 16th inst.:

"Through Colonel Bratt, I learned it is expected that England will come to an agreement with Finland. It is assumed that the English intend to land troops in Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik at the same time. It is believed that Churchill will carry out this plan as quickly as possible because of the ice in Oeresund and the difficulties which a larger part of the German fleet would undergo in attempting this passage."

For the Foreign Minister

(signed) O. Tostrup

**DOCUMENT NO. 26****NOTE FROM THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE  
MINISTER OF STATE**

[The following communication reveals, by way of contrast to the Norwegian attitude, the Swedish Government's adherence to a policy of strict neutrality.]

[Translation]

Foreign Ministry

Oslo, February 17, 1940

Strictly Confidential

War Between Finland and the Soviet Union.  
Sweden's Position.

To the Minister of State:

I have the honor to inform you that the Embassy in Stockholm stated the following in a confidential report of the 16th inst:

"According to an opinion offered this afternoon by some one in the Foreign Ministry, nothing new has at all changed the situation that has already existed for some time, namely, that Finland is stressing her need for military help and that Sweden is seeking to increase voluntary assistance but is maintaining her neutrality."

For the Foreign Minister

(signed) O. Tostrup

**DOCUMENT NO. 27****MINUTES OF THE NORWEGIAN CABINET MEETING HELD ON  
MARCH 2, 1940**

[On March 2, 1940, the British Ambassador in Oslo communicated to the Norwegian Foreign Minister the demand that the Norwegian Government permit the transport of Allied troops through Norway to Finland. A similar démarche was made in Stockholm. The record of the Norwegian Cabinet Meeting, called to consider the demand, shows that Norway desired to let the Allied troops through only if Sweden agreed to do likewise. However, the Norwegian Foreign Minister was not inclined to take any measures to prevent such transport. In his opinion, Norway should have confined herself to a mere formal protest. Norway should not act in such a way, he explained, that she would find herself in the war "on the wrong side." Thus, from the very outset, the Norwegian Government not only acquiesced to British neutrality violations but consented to work hand in glove with Britain.]

[Translation]

**Government Conference Held at 6 P.M., on March 2.**

*The Foreign Minister* announced that the English Ambassador sent word at 3 o'clock today that the Allies are willing to send troops to Finland and therefore would have to march through Norway and Sweden. This was a preliminary arrangement. A formal announcement was to follow a request for permission to pass through and a preliminary answer had been received here.

The Foreign Minister stated that this matter would have to be examined by the Government and also by the Foreign Committee and then be presented to the Storting, for without the latter's consent, troops of foreign powers could not pass through the land. The French Ambassador had also visited the Foreign Minister and announced the support of his government for England's request.

The Foreign Minister conferred with the Swedish Foreign Minister. Minister of State Bull is to go to Stockholm this evening in order to get the Swedish Government's point of view, and to discuss the drafting of an answer to the inquiry of the English Government.

The Foreign Minister proposed a plan for the reply to England. His plan points out the neutral position of the Norwegian Government and holds firm to it. Not willingly will the Norwegian Government be drawn into war and have her land made the battleground for the troops of the Great Powers.

*The Premier* agreed to this reply.

*Torp* likewise agreed. However, he asked whether, if the English and French troops would come after all, we would be satisfied with a protest or would take steps to prevent their passage.

*Koht* believed that we had to be satisfied with protesting. Our attitude should not make us enter the war on the wrong side if we cannot avoid being drawn into the fight.

*Stöstad* was of the opinion that we should follow Sweden's example.

*Koht* agreed; but, as far as he knew, the Swedish Government was certainly against it.

*Lie:* We must consider the potential consequences. England does not send help to Finland, because Sweden and Norway oppose their passing through, what then? Might that be a political trick designed to place responsibility for Finland's defeat on Norway and Sweden. Bull must not depart with definite instructions. We must take a definite stand on Monday.

*Koht:* I agree. We can do nothing but concur with Sweden's decision.

*Hindahl:* The Premier understood that if Bull was to travel (to Sweden) he might take with him (and explain) the opinion of the Norwegian Government so as to have it considered with that of the Swedish Government. There are peace rumors, and certainly there is something in these rumors for they are becoming more persistent. We are confronted by a diplomatic move to hinder Finland from making peace—and an attempt to widen the fronts of the Allies. If we permit this, we shall be at war with Russia as well as with Germany. I think that we must refuse and say "No," even if Sweden would decide to say "Yes." There are strained relations in Sweden which will cause Sweden to say "Yes." When Bull returns on Monday, we must re-examine the matter and also discuss it with the Storting.

*Torp* reported Leon Blum as stating, at the International Conference, that French troops were ready to go to Finland immediately. A million Norwegian Kroner had been bought up to assure their maintenance. Blum said that this was the Senate's point of view. We must keep our way clear to say "Yes" on Monday, even if we answer "No" while Sweden says "Yes." Such an important matter should be considered by the Central Committee before it reaches the Foreign Committee.

*Koht:* We must communicate our point of view to Sweden. However, all facilities should be kept free to enable us to follow Sweden whenever she says "Yes."

They say the French Government is divided as to what course to take in case the Northern Governments say "No." Two tendencies exist in the Finnish Government relative to peace rumors. One political party takes the point of view that Finland should make peace on the basis of Russian demands.

A Northern peace move presumably has been well received in Russia, but not so a German proposal.

On being asked by Wold, Koht said the reason for Sweden's answering "No" to Finland was that Sweden did not wish to be drawn into war with the Great Powers.

*Ljungberg* thought that this situation should be regarded more pessimistically than optimistically. If Sweden says "Yes," we must do the same. The political situation in Italy is strained. That country has warned us that we cannot rely on obtaining war supplies from there.

*Lie*: We must not run the risk, if the occasion arises, of having the Swedish Government refer to the Norwegian Government's point of view as preventing Sweden from replying in the affirmative.

*Hjelmtveit*: The Premier will present the Norwegian point of view to the Swedish Government for consideration. Our attitude must favor mutual action and must leave us the possibility of assuming a definite stand on Monday. For the rest, I am in full accord with the Premier.

*Wold*: We must make our own decision first, but arrive at a final stand only after we have consulted Sweden.

*The Premier* emphasized that our point of view had to be expressed clearly at the Stockholm conference.

*The Premier* reported the matter by telephone to the Chairman of the Foreign Committee. The Government deemed it absolutely necessary to instruct the Foreign Committee at once about the situation. Hambro replied that he would consider convening the Committee tomorrow.

*Minutes Taken by Privy Councillor Hjelmtveit.*

Personally, I would like to add that the decision to refuse the British was unanimous. However, it was understood that the question would be examined anew should Sweden say "Yes"—contrary to all expectations.

I should like to mention, furthermore, that some members of the Government wanted to take action. We should help Finland in a military way in order to save Norway, they maintained. I declared positively that I, for one, was unable to accept this conclusion and that

our country would not go to war voluntarily so long as I was Premier.

P. S. Sunday March 3. Minister of State Bull has reported from Stockholm that Sweden answered "No" Saturday evening.

(signed) N. (Nygaardsvold)

## DOCUMENT NO. 28

### NOTE FROM THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE MINISTER OF STATE

[On February 5, 1940, the Norwegian Ambassador in London sent a secret report of a meeting of Press representatives with Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the British Admiralty, to the Norwegian Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister in turn relayed it to the Norwegian Minister of State. The actual report is Enclosure B to the following note.]

[Translation]

Foreign Ministry

Oslo, February 15, 1940  
2 Appendices  
Strictly Confidential

Neutrality of the Northern Countries.  
Declaration of the British Naval Minister.\*

Minister of State:

I have the honor to submit to you a strictly confidential Report of the Embassy in London of the 5th inst. (No. 372). A Copy with one piece of the addenda is enclosed.

For the Foreign Minister:

(signed) O. Tostrup

\* This is a literal translation of the original Norwegian term. "First Lord of the Admiralty" or "Admiralty" would be more in accordance with English usage.

**ENCLOSURE A. NOTE FROM THE NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR  
IN LONDON TO THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER****Copy****[Translation]****Royal Norwegian Legation****London, Feb. 5, 1940****No. 372****One Appendix****Strictly Confidential**

Reports by Collaborators  
of the Press at the Legation: Churchill.

To the Foreign Ministry:

I am sending you herewith copies of a letter Mr. Martinsen wrote to me on February 2.

Mr. Martinsen had previously told me that he and other members of the press had been invited to luncheon to meet Mr. Churchill. We were agreed that he [Martinsen] had to proceed very cautiously, and he certainly did so.

(signed) Erik Colban

**ENCLOSURE B. LETTER FROM A NORWEGIAN PRESS REPRESENTATIVE TO THE NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON**

[The following report is doubtlessly one of the most interesting records that could be made public during the present European War. Winston Churchill is shown here in an altogether new light. He speaks as a man who, while holding the most responsible position in the British Cabinet, seems unacquainted with the simplest political facts. His narrow vision astonished his listeners; his cynicism startled them.]

**[Translation]****Copy****(From M. Martinsen, February 2, 1940)****Secret**

To Norwegian Minister Colban,

Press representatives of all the Northern States were present at the luncheon given by Mrs. Philipmore for Mr. Churchill today at which

the guest of honor gave vent to his feelings and was somewhat bitter about the manner in which his speech containing advice to the neutrals had been received. He closed with the suggestion that Norway and Sweden prepare to come to the assistance of Finland, that through their Ministers in London they should request help according to a secret plan which would be put before them. The plan, however, still required consideration.

I took the liberty of mentioning our imports, for during the half hour in which we awaited Churchill's arrival, I had discussed this matter with his predecessor in the last Labor Government, Mr. Alexander, who had promised in the House of Commons and in conferences at the Admiralty to see that we received imports. He was familiar with the red tape in the Ministry of Economic Warfare and almost laughed at all the difficulties. Alexander said that we should have no fears on that account.

During the course of the conversation Churchill was very bitter over the reception the neutrals accorded his famous speech. But he understood our reserve and also that we were not prepared. I explained to him that we are no further than Britain was at Munich, at which he laughed bitterly.

He raged continually against Norway and Sweden, especially against Sweden. He had already "written Denmark off," for, he said, it would not be advisable to defend that country because "sooner or later it would be taken by Germany!"

Swedish ore should not be sent to Germany, Churchill said, maintaining that from Narvik it was carried inside the three-mile limit. Consequently he spoke in disagreeable tones about Norway, and in conclusion named the three ships which, he stated, had been torpedoed within the three-mile limit. Once more I was obliged to contradict him. The Norwegian Foreign Minister had proved in the Storting, I told him, that the three ships had not been torpedoed and that two of them had sunk outside the three-mile limit. He had not heard of the report by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, a summary of which I sent to the *Daily Herald*, which had asked for it at the time. But it will hardly be printed now, for the belief was that the three ships were torpedoed within our territorial waters. Churchill wished to have



the oil supplies from Rumania stopped, but he admitted that this was very difficult. He then went on storming about the Swedish ore, admitting, however, that if ore shipments were stopped "Stockholm would be bombed" the next day. He spoke with cynical slyness. After sitting deep in thought for some time, he agreed with me that the Scandinavian statesmen had reason to think twice before plunging their countries and their people into disaster.

He agreed with Mr. Alexander that the best manner of dragging us into the war, which was the great object, would be for us to take sides with Finland.

He considered help for Finland of utmost importance. The Allies, however, could act only indirectly. It would be a different matter if the Norwegian fjords were endangered. He promised that in that case the British fleet would rush in.

However, Britain could not send troops, for the Germans were difficult to strangle. More than once he prophesied that the war would last longer than he had at first thought. The more one listened to his words, which were often characterized by ignorance and a lack of direct information, the clearer the impression became that the policy of Norway and Sweden was the right one. There may be friction with regard to the Swedish ore. The Swedes say that its importance is exaggerated, that the Germans have mines in other neighboring countries and can get on without the Swedish ore.

Churchill thought that the Swedes should tell the Germans that the importation must cease, that the Finnish affair was the reason for the action, since the North required everything for itself and since many miners had been mobilized. He would have them say that it was beyond their power to send anything for the time being.

He demanded that we promise to let no ship loaded with ore proceed from Narvik within the territorial waters. We might then present, through our Minister in London, our wishes with regard to imports and he would see to it that we were satisfied. He said that the sovereignty of Norway was guaranteed by Britain. He could not tolerate anybody taking possession of our coast.

He declared cynically that one might even quietly hope that the Northern countries would join the other side, so that one could choose

the strategical points needed, and have done with it. This was a very nasty remark, and an icy silence ensued. Thereupon he assured us once more that he appreciated the difficulties of the neutrals and explained why the Allies must win the war. He added that the Germans under the Kaiser had been much stronger, that uncertainty was spreading in Germany, but would take time. He described in masterly fashion alleged cruel acts of the Germans at sea interpreting them as definite signs of weakness. He sincerely hoped that the Americas would join in guaranteeing peace and would cooperate in the solution of economic problems after the war.

Norway and Sweden, however, should discuss the line of action they could take in case of war and what they needed and expected for their support. This they were to make known through their Ministers in London. The earlier the better, he said. He emphasized the latter several times.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) M. Martinsen





# **FACSIMILES OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS**



**Cover for Documents.**

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**Nature of Enclosures.**

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**Notes or Letters written.**

A2

SECRET

COPY No. 30

STRATFORCE PLAN

and

FIRST MAINTENANCE PROJECT



DOCUMENT NO. 1

STRATFORD.

PLAN AND FIRST MAINTENANCE PROJECT.

CONTENTS.

- Para. 1. General.
- " 2. Secrecy.
  - " 3. Establishments and Scale of Equipment.
  - " 4. Relations with local authorities.
  - " 5. Transport and Accommodation.
  - " 6. Maintenance.
  - " 7. Medical.
  - " 8. Reporting of Casualties.
  - " 9. Reinforcements.
  - " 10. Accounting Instructions.
  - " 11. Courts Martial.
  - " 12. Maps..
  - " 13. Intercommunication.
  - " 14. Security Intelligence arrangements.
  - " 15. Signal Security.
  - " 16. Relationship between British Troops and Local Military Authorities.
  - " 17. Special Fittings to Respirators.
  - " 18. Recognition of Aircraft.

APPENDICES.

- Appendix "A". Composition of Stratford.
- " "B". Provisional Action Scale.
  - " "C". Signal Instructions.
  - " "D". Special Scale of Explosives.

## BRITAIN'S DESIGNS ON NORWAY

STRATFORCE PLAN.AND FIRST MAINTENANCE PROJECT.1. General.

This plan is for the despatch of small forces of infantry, engineers and attached troops to :-

512  
547  
548

2. Secrecy.

The most stringent precautions will be taken to ensure the secrecy of the move required to put this plan into operation. In order to achieve this and the plan will never be referred to except by its code name, and until embarkation has been completed the destination of the force will not be disclosed to anyone.

3. Establishments and Scale of Equipment.

A detailed order of battle and establishments for the force have been issued under S.D.I.(b) B.M. No. XXX 52 dated 2nd February, 1940.

A copy is attached at Appendix 'A'.

A special scale of G.1098 equipment has been issued to units.

4. Relations with local authorities.

The force will be entirely dependent on local authorities for transport, fresh supplies, accommodation, hospital and ambulance services.

The closest liaison between local military commanders and local civil authorities will therefore be essential. Arrangements should be made with the British Consul or Vice Consul at each port for the provision of interpreters as required.

5. Transport and Accommodation.

No transport or tentage will be taken with the force. One of the first tasks of the Commanders at each place on disembarkation will be to arrange for the provision of sufficient transport to move baggage for general purposes, and for accommodation for his men.

6. Maintenance.

Maintenance from the United Kingdom will be by weekly or ten day sailings in normal trade shipping from the United Kingdom to 548, and thence by local ships. It is possible that a major British force will be operating from 512 in which case this force will be responsible for the maintenance of STRATFORD.

The force will thus have to rely largely on local purchase. For this reason two R.A.S.C. officers, a paymaster and a Warrant Officer R.A.O.C. will accompany each force. Special instructions for the R.A.S.C. officers are being issued under separate cover.

- (a) Supplies. 14 days supplies will accompany the force. An additional 10 days supplies are being shipped to 512 for distribution from that port to 547 and 548 as required.

2.

These will be loaded under .O. arrangements. Of these, 2 days are made up in self contained rations in the form of 4 cases per 32 men per day. The remainder are in bulk and will be taken over by the senior R.A.S.C. officer, accompanying each force immediately on landing, to open up a small Detail Issue Depot. Fresh produce will be obtained locally by an R.A.S.C. officer.

A provisional ration scale for the force is attached at Appendix "B". If local conditions require, this scale may be varied accordingly by the force commander and reported to the War Office in due course.

- (b) Amendments in strength of units will be sent to the R.A.S.C. officer at each port one day in advance of requirements.
- (c) Fuel and Light. No supplies of fuel and light are being provided except candles for emergency use. Supplies, including petrol for cookers, will be obtained locally.
- (d) Hospital Supplies. These will be obtained locally by the R.A.S.C. officer on the advice of the Senior Medical Officer.
- (e) Ammunition. Ammunition on the following scale per battalion will accompany the force:-
- |                                  |  |                   |
|----------------------------------|--|-------------------|
| ① S.A.A.                         | Mk. VII 178425 Tracer 2000.  |                   |
| A/T Rifle ( $\frac{1}{2}$ scale) |  | 2640 rounds.      |
| 3" Mortar                        |  | (195 H.E.         |
|                                  |  | (117 Smoke.       |
| 2" Mortar                        |  | 864 Smoke.        |
| ② .38" (Revolver)                |  | 894               |
| Hand Grenades                    |  | 180               |
| Very Lights                      |  | (384 illuminating |
|                                  |  | { 48 red          |
|                                  |  | { 48 green        |
| Explosives                       | A special scale of explosives has been arranged and will be taken. |                   |
|                                  | (This is shown at Appendix 'D').                                   |                   |
- ③ Infantry will embark with rifle and revolver ammunition in pouches. No other type of ammunition will be carried unboxed.
- (f) Ordnance Stores. Indents for Ordnance Stores will be sent to the Brigade Ordnance Warrant Officer at each port. If urgently required they will be met by local purchase so far as possible, in all other circumstances the indents will be forwarded to the War Office.
- (g) Mess Equipment, Sports Gear etc. Detailed instructions have been issued separately showing the extra allowance (dead weight) which may be utilized for the carriage of the above mentioned stores.

#### 7. Medical.

No medical personnel other than the A.D.M.S., S.M.O., and the personnel attached to the battalion will accompany the force initially. Slightly augmented medical equipment of battalions will be taken. Immediate arrangements will have to be made locally for the use of ambulances, hospitals and other local facilities; the senior medical officer in each place will make immediate contacts with local military medical authorities, and if these do not exist, with the local health officers.

Instructions will be issued to the A.D.M.S. by the War Office. under separate cover.

#### 8. Reporting of Casualties.

- (a) Unit orderly room Sergeants for duty at 2nd Echelon will report to Queens High Cliffe Hotel, Margate.

/(b)

3.

- (b) In the initial stages casualties will be reported from 512 and 547 to Force H.Q. ( 548 ). The latter will consolidate and transmit deaths of officers and other ranks by W/T if traffic facilities permit.
- (c) Except as modified in (b) above the normal procedure laid down in F.S.R. Vol. 1, Section 26, will be carried out, as far as local communications permit.
- (d) In the case of admissions to hospital the Nominal Rolls on A.F.W.3034 and progress reports on A.F.W.3034A will be prepared by officers commanding at 512, 547 and 548 respectively and despatched by post, as sailings permit to Casualty Section, 2 Bainbridge Street, New Oxford Street, London, W.C.1.

9. Reinforcements.

Will be demanded by W/T direct to War Office (Forcedly One).

10. Accounting Instructions.

- (a) Payment for supplies and services purchased locally will be effected through the paymaster accompanying each force.
- (b) Officers bills etc., duly certified as to delivery, should be forwarded to the paymaster.
- (c) Imprest for bills and local services, payment and accounting of advances to officers and cash payments to other ranks will be governed by F.S.R. Vol. 1, Chapter XXI.

11. Courts Martial.

A Court Martial warrant for the Officer Commanding Stratforce will be issued direct.

12. Maps.

These will be delivered to Force H.Q. on board ship before embarkation under arrangements made by G.S.(P) War Office. Except for sheets of the 1/1,000,000 map only photographic copies of 534 and 535 1/100,000 (and in some places 1/200,000) will be available at the commencement of the campaign. These maps are very old and mostly of pre-1900 date; they will carry no grid and in most cases no contours.

13. Intercommunication.

- (a) Within the Force. One infantry brigade signal section is provided to link up the three locations. Wireless and the civil telegraph system will be used.

Special acrials have been provided for the wireless sets of the signal section to enable the ranges to be covered.

- (b) Between Force H.Q., and the War Office. There is no direct cable line from 512, 547 or 548. Communications between Force H.Q. and the War Office will therefore be mainly by W/T from 548. In an emergency the Naval Control Service Officer on the Consular staff will provide a channel of communication.

Technical instructions to O.C. Sigs. of the force will be issued under separate cover. A copy is attached at Appendix "C".

/Ciphers.

Ciphers

- (a) H.Q. Force will be provided with the necessary high grade cipher books for communication to the War Office.
- (b) Within the force subject to normal security restrictions, stencil cipher will be used.
- (c) If the necessity arises for using interdepartmental cipher (e.g. to local British authorities, Military Attache Stockholm etc.) arrangements will be made with the local consulate.
- (d) Personnel is being provided as follows:-
  - (i) Force H.Q. 1 officer 3 other ranks.
  - (ii) Brigade H.Q. 2 other ranks.
  - (iii) At 512. Regimental personnel will work the stencil cipher

14. Security Intelligence Arrangements.

- (a) An intelligence officer and cipher personnel are located at each port. Censorship of correspondence will be carried out by officers of units. The censor stamps and cipher stencils will be issued before embarkation. Full details of censorship and what may be written in letters are contained in Manual of Military Intelligence, Pamphlet No.2.
- (b) The correct address for all correspondence of personnel in the force will be:-
 

Number, Rank and Name,  
Squadron, Battery or Company, etc.,  
Unit or H.Q. (if serving on the H.Q. Staff),  
c/o A.P.C.

- (c) The control of all press representatives will be in the hands of Officer Commanding troops at each port who will be guided by instructions issued by the Officer Commanding the force.

15. Signal Security.

- (a) The reference to places by numbers under the code already issued will cease after embarkation.
- (b) Local telephones will have to be used. The utmost discretion is necessary as no control of this service will be possible.
- (c) A block of code names will be issued to Force H.Q. under separate cover.
- (d) The telegraphic address of the force is:-

STRATFORCL for 343.  
CONVERT for 547.  
OUTLOOK for 512.

These names will be registered with postal authorities on arrival overseas. All telegrams from U.K. will be sent to the force c/o War Office until further instructions are issued.

16. Relationship between British Troops and Local Military Authorities.

Compliments will be paid to Local Military Officers etc., according to equivalent rank as if they were British Officers.

/17.

17. Special fittings to Respirators.

Special fittings to respirators are being sent in bulk with other stores. These should be fitted to respirators as soon as possible after arrival. Fittings are packed in boxes of 60 and are provided on the scale of one for each Officer or Other Rank. Instructions for fitting are attached to the inside of the lid of the box in which they are packed. Unit gas instructors should supervise the fitting and ensure that the instructions are rigidly followed.

18. Recognition of Aircraft.

Steps should be taken to ensure that personnel are able to distinguish enemy aircraft from those of the allies and neutral countries. The local allied military Authorities should be able to help in this connection, in addition, silhouettes of GERMAN aircraft will be issued separately.

AMENDMENT.

PARA. 6. LINE 5.

After "STRATFORCE." Add: "The first maintenance ship should arrive within a fortnight of the arrival of the force."

PARA. 6(a). LINE 2.

For "10 days supplies" Read "20 days supplies".

# FACSIMILES OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS A9

SECRET

## STRATFORCE PLAN AND FIRST MAINTENANCE PROJECT

### Amendment No.1

General. ADD at end of paragraph 1.

"In the event of the forces at 547 having to withdraw they will go to 548.

"Commander 547 will investigate on the spot to discover what shipping could be made available to carry out the move. He will make this the subject of an early report to the War Office through Force H.Q.

"The provision of escorts will be arranged by the War Office."

### Paragraph 5. First line.

DELETE from "No transport" to "Force". Substitute:-

"5. The following scale of transport for the force at 547 will be embarked for despatch so that it can follow shortly after the arrival of the units.

#### Transport for 547.

	<u>No.</u>
Bde. H.Q.	
M/C	3
Trucks 15-cwt. office	1
Trucks water tank	1
Rifle Ens. (two).	
M/C	14
Trucks 15-cwt. office	2
Trucks A.A.L.M.Gs.	8
Trucks Water Tank	4
Carriers Bren Gun	20
Fd. Coy. (less one sec.)	
M/C	5
Truck 15 cwt water	1
" " tools & stores	4
" " compressor	2
Det. Sigs.	
M/C	2
Vehicles	4
Total	<hr/> 71 <hr/>

Other than this no transport or tentage will be taken with the Force."

G.S.(P).  
4th April, 1940..

APPENDIX "A".COMPOSITION OF STRATFORD.

Destination.	Unit.
548.	{ Infantry Brigade H.Q. (Force H.Qs. { 4 Lincoln { 1/4 K.O.Y.L.I. { Sec. 55 Fd. Coy., R.E. { Brigade Sig. Sec. (49 Div.Sigs) { (less detachments).
547	{ 148 Infantry Brigade H.Q. { 1/5 Leicesters. { 8 Foresters { 55 Fd., Coy. (less 1 Sec.) { Detachment Sigs.
512	{ Hallam. { Detachment Sigs. { Details.



# FACSIMILES OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS A11

## APPENDIX "B".

### PROVISIONAL RATION SCALE.

Commodity	Scale of Issue	Equivalents.
	<u>Ozs.</u>	
Bread	16	Biscuit 12 oz.
Meat Frozen or Fresh	14	Preserved Meat 12 oz. or M & V Ration 24 oz.
Bacon	4	Tinned Bacon 3- $\frac{1}{3}$ oz. or Meat Loaf 4 oz.
Cheese	1	Tinned Cheese 1 oz. or Eating Chocolate 2 oz.
Tea	$\frac{3}{4}$	
Cocoa	$\frac{1}{2}$	
Sugar	4	
Milk Condensed	3	
Jam or Marmalade	2	Dried Fruits 2 oz. or Golden Syrup 2 oz.
Margarine	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Oatmeal	2	Rice 2 oz.
Fresh Potatoes	12	Tinned Potatoes 6 oz.
Fresh Vegetables	8	Tinned Vegetables 4 oz. or Tinned Tomatoes 4 oz. Tinned Vegetables or Tinned Tomatoes 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ oz.
Dried Peas or Beans	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Marmite	$\frac{1}{2}$	
Salt	$\frac{1}{2}$	
Pepper	1/100th	
Mustard	1/100th	
Pickles	3/7ths	Sauce 1/6th (fluid) oz.
<u>EXTRAS</u>		
Tobacco - Cigarettes	2 ozs.	Once weekly.
" " Pipes	2 boxes	" "
Rum		On medical advice when authorized by G.O.C.
or		
Cocoa (1 pint) or Tea (1 pint) @		
<p> <u>Tea</u> - Tea 1/6th oz.  Milk (Condensed) 4/5th oz.  Sugar <math>\frac{1}{2}</math> oz.  <u>Cocoa</u> - Cocoa <math>\frac{1}{2}</math> oz.  Milk (Condensed) 4/5th oz.  Sugar <math>\frac{1}{2}</math> oz. </p>		
Ascorbic Acid	.025 grams.	As necessary on medical advice.

APPENDIX "C".STRATFORD.  
-----SIGNAL INSTRUCTIONS.1. Use of existing civil facilities.

Signal Communications between Force Headquarters and the War Office and between parts of the force will be, in the first place, through civil channels. Immediately on arrival at destination contact should be made with the local telegraph authorities and arrangements should be made for the disposal of telegrams.

The following telegraphic addresses will be used by the three parts of the force:-

548	STRATFORCE	(followed by the place name)
547	CONVERT	{ " " " " " }
512	OUTLOOK	{ " " " " " }

The commander of each part of the force should register his telegraphic address with the local telegraph authorities and arrange for the delivery to him of all incoming telegrams bearing this address or for their collection if necessary. He should arrange also for telegrams to be accepted addressed to other parts of the force. Telegrams to the War Office will be addressed "Troopers, London".

Arrangements should be made by each commander for any telephone connections required. The telephone numbers of all connections so taken up should be circulated throughout the force.

2. Wireless Communications with the U.K.

A portable wireless set is provided for use by Force Headquarters as an emergency link with the War Office. This set will work with a station at CATERICK which will operate on the schedule shown in Annexure "A". Immediately on arrival at destination the set at Force Headquarters will open up communication with CATERICK using frequencies in accordance with the schedule at Annexure "A".

A wireless set with H.V. AVONFORCE will also operate with CATERICK on the same schedule. Emergency communication can thus be established between STRATFORCE and AVONFORCE, but this should be used only when other means fail in order that the more important channels to the U.K. may be made full use of.

The CATERICK station will be the directing station.

Emergency communication with the U.K. may also be obtained at times through H.M. Ships, by wireless and by destroyer letter service.

In the event of the force at either 512 or 547 being completely out of touch with Force Headquarters, emergency wireless communication can be established between those places and the War Office through the CATERICK station, working on the Schedule at Annexure "A" as far as it lies within the frequency range of the No.11 Wireless Set.

/A set

## FACSIMILES OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS A13

A set at each of 512 and 547 will be set aside for this purpose and will keep listening watch daily for sufficient periods to become familiar with working conditions.

Call signs of the stations affected by this instruction will be :-

Catterick	ZHV
Force H.Q. STRATFORCE	CJX
Force H.Q. AVONFORCE	VQY
512	VQX
547	ZHW

### 3. Wireless Communication with the Force.

Wireless Sets No.11 have been provided for use between the parts of the force. Call signs for these sets will be :-

Force H.Q. STRATFORCE	VVC
512	VVE
547	VVC

Frequencies suitable for use within the force are allotted in Annexure "B". The O.C. Brigade Signals should draw up schedules of working based on the details given in Annexure "B". A large number of spare frequencies are provided to permit of avoiding interference.

### 4. General notes on Wireless in High Latitudes.

#### (a) Difficulty of Wireless Communication.

All the wireless links referred to in these instructions cover great ranges in relation to the light portable sets used. Communication will present great difficulties and will be slow. Deliberate jamming by enemy stations is probable. All wireless operators must be prepared to spend infinite time and patience in getting their messages through. In the interests of security wireless discipline must be rigidly enforced.

#### (b) Propagation of Wireless Waves.

A guide to the most suitable frequencies for use over various distances is shown at Annexure "A"2. These frequencies have been found from practical experience to be sufficiently accurate for use as a guide. There may be discrepancies between these figures and figures which would be deduced from S.T.Vol.II, Part II, 1936 Supplement "Skip Distance Graphs for Short Wave Signalling", which were produced from calculations and should be treated with reserve.

In high latitudes in the summer months, skip distances on all frequencies are relatively small, and the attenuation on any frequency is relatively higher. Hence for satisfactory communication, frequencies higher than those used in normal latitudes must be employed. In the winter months the opposite is the case, owing to the reduced daylight. Skip distances become greater and the attenuation on all frequencies decreases. It is only during the equinox periods that conditions may be considered as resembling those encountered in normal latitudes.

/In hign.

In high latitudes in the summer months "fade outs" may be experienced on higher frequencies. Signals will be found to disappear completely and may not reappear again for up to 6 hours. The phenomena does not occur very frequently. Intervals of 27 days are general. The use of a much higher frequency may effect a cure, but generally there is no cure.

(c) Condensation.

Many troubles may be caused by condensation in low temperatures. Equipment, should, if possible, be kept warm. If this is impossible, personnel must be forbidden to wash or cook near the equipment. This is to avoid moisture forming on the cold metal and freezing subsequently. If this happens on components of a transmitter or receiver it will probably render the instrument useless. Moisture forming on commutators of machines may form a layer of ice and prevent the brushes making contact.

(d) Batteries.

Charged accumulators will not freeze in cold temperatures although the A.H. capacity may decrease as much as 20%. If, however, cells are left in a discharged condition overnight in low temperatures the electrolyte will freeze. If this happens, cells must be thawed out slowly.

Glacier ice (not snow) will produce water for topping up. The suitability of water for batteries may be tested by adding a 10% Silver Nitrate Solution to a sample (not to the battery). If the solution remains clear, the water is sufficiently good to be used in the accumulator.

The voltage of dry batteries decreases as the temperature falls. Batteries can be re-tored by warming gently.

(e) Charging Engines.

Trouble will be experienced in starting small engines in cold weather as the oil becomes very "gummy" and it may be found impossible to turn the engine. Engines, will, therefore, have to be warmed with a blow lamp before they can be turned. The thinnest grade of oil should be used. It is preferable to start the engine in a warmed room.

Carburettor fires may occur after the engine has been started. The outside of the carburettor should be wiped dry after "flooding" to reduce the chance of fire by "spitting back." Fire extinguishers should be kept handy.

(f) Earths.

Clean ice or snow does not constitute an earth; nor is it easy to get a good earth connection in frozen ground. The alternative of a counterpoise is a more satisfactory solution.

## FACSIMILES OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS

A15

ANNEXURE "A" 1.

Schedule of hours of watch and frequencies which will be in operation at the CATERICK station, call sign ZHV, from date of sailing of STRATFORCE.

- NOTES:- (a) This schedule will remain in force until amended by orders issued from the directing station, ZHV.
- (b) CJX and VQY will keep continuous watch on the hours and frequencies shown in this schedule, from the time of arrival at destination until further orders are issued from the directing station ZHV.
- (c) At Annexure "A"2 is a table showing the hours during which communication is likely to be obtained over various distances.

Hours (G.M.T.)	Frequencies Kc/s.
2359 - 0030	5160
0030 - 0200	3560
0200 - 0230	5160
0230 - 0300	3560
0300 - 0330	5160
0330 - 0400	3560
0400 - 0600	3560
0600 - 0800	5160
0800 - 1000	7010
1000 - 1100	12440
1100 - 1200	7010
1200 - 1300	12440
1300 - 1400	7010
1400 - 1500	12440
1500 - 1600	7010
1600 - 1800	7010
1800 - 1900	5160
1900 - 2000	7010
2000 - 2100	5160
2100 - 2200	7010
2200 - 2300	5160
2300 - 2359	7010

ANNEXURE "A"2.

Table covering 24 hours showing the frequencies on which communication is most likely to be obtained with CATTERICK ZHV, by stations at various distances from it, working on the schedule at Annexure A.1.

Times (G.M.T.)	Station at 1200 miles	Station at 900 miles.	Station at 600 miles.
2359 - 0200	5160	5160	3560
0200 - 0400	5160	5160	3560
0400 - 0600	3560	3560	3560
0600 - 0800	5160	5160	5160
0800 - 1000	7010	7010	7010
1000 - 1200	12440	12440	7010
1200 - 1400	12440	12440	7010
1400 - 1600	12440	12440	7010
1600 - 1800	7010	7010	7010
1800 - 2000	7010	7010	5160
2000 - 2200	7010	7010	5160
2200 - 2359	7010	7010	5160

ANNEXURE "P".

Allotment of Frequencies for No.11 Sets H.P.

for use within STRAUFORCE.

Approximate Times G.M.T.	100 miles						300 miles						Seasons
	Kc/s.	Kc/s.	Kc/s.	Kc/s.	Kc/s.	Kc/s.	Kc/s.	Kc/s.	Kc/s.	Kc/s.	Kc/s.	Kc/s.	
2000 hrs - 0200 hrs.	4285	4300	4320	4360	4380	4420	5060	4855	4840	4790	5120	5180	March.
0200 hrs - 0800 hrs.	4285	4300	4320	4330	4420	4440	4285	4440	4420	4320	4330	4300	to
0800 hrs - 1600 hrs.	7050	7140	7250	7310	7460	7480	7460	7480	7310	7250	7140	7050	April.
1600 hrs - 2000 hrs.	5060	5120	5180	5220	5300	5400	7460	7480	7310	7250	7140	7050	
Mid. - 0400 hrs.	4285	4300	4320	4330	4420	4440	4855	5120	5180	5400	5220	5300	May
0400 hrs - 1800 hrs.	7050	7140	7250	7310	7480	7460	7460		7310	7250	7140	7050	to
1800 hrs - Mid.	4855	5120	5180	5220	5300	5400			7480	7250	7140	7050	July

Appendix "D"Special Scale of Explosives

<u>Item</u>	<u>Store</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>Total</u>
1	Detonators No.27	2000	2000	500	500	5,000
2	Fuze Instantaneous detonating TNT Mk.III feet	4000	4000	800	800	9,600
3	Fuze Safety No.11 Mk.I or Mk.II feet	2304	2304	768	768	6,144
4	Detonators electric No.8 Commercial	400	400	200	200	1,200
5	Guncotton Dry Primers Field 1-oz. Mk.II or Mk.I.	2100	2100	960	960	6,120
6	Guncotton Wet Slabs Field 1-lb. Mk.I or 15-oz. Mk.I	224	224	224	224	896
7	Igniters Safety fuze percussion	30				30
8	Ammonal, Cartridge packed tons	11	11	1	1	24
9	Matches fuzes safety boxes	240	240	120	120	720

The following markings will be on packages:-

- A. Bright red circle 3" diameter. Black 1 within circle.
- B. Bright red circle 3" diameter. Black 2 within circle.
- C. Bright blue circle 3" diameter. Black 1 within circle.
- D. Bright blue circle 3" diameter. Black 2 within circle.

No package should exceed 80 lbs. in weight.



## DOCUMENT NO. 2

1/5 ORDERLY ROOM  
5 APR 1940  
132a THE  
LANCASHIRE  
REGIMENT.

SEE BY  
CO.  
CONTENT  
RANK  
RANK

LETTERS AFFECTING THE PAYMENT OF OFFICERS AND OTHER  
RANKS AFTER EMBARKATION.

The following notes on Pay matters are published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

## OTHER RANKS

## (A) Payments to.

1. Made on acquittance rolls from date of embarkation
2. Made as often as necessary, and based on net rate of pay shown in soldier's A.B. 64.
3. Recorded in soldier's A.B. 64 by paying Officer who will sign entry therein.
4. Will be signed for by the soldier on acquittance rolls.

## (B) Funds

Demands for cash will be made on A.F.N. 1488, a book of which may be obtained from Paymaster. Renewals will only be made on production of stub of old book.

Accounting is simple and is confined to two forms viz :-

Acquittance Rolls (A.F.N. 1513), and

Company Commander's Account (A.F. N 1513A,

## (C) Acquittance Rolls

1. To be serially numbered
2. Kept in duplicate
3. Total entered in A.F. N 1531A
4. Original to Paymaster as soon as payment is made - duplicate retained.
5. Separate rolls to be made out for personnel of each regiment or Corps

## (D) Company Commander's Account

1. Kept on A.F. N 1531A in duplicate
2. Closed at end of each month.
3. Original to Paymaster - duplicate retained.

## ADVANCE TO OFFICERS

1. Advance Books (in pads of 25) may be obtained on written application (first issue only) from Paymaster.

Units may find it convenient to make one written application on behalf of all officers for the first issue. In that event the application should take the following form :-

"Please supply Army Forms W.3241 as under :-

Name of Unit.....

Rank Name and Unit I certify that this is the only

-2-

application that has been, or will  
be made by me for a first issue of  
A.F. W 3241.

.....  
(Officers' Signature)

The above was signed in my presence.

Date.....

.....

Officer Commanding.....

2. Subsequent requirements of A.F. W 3241 will be met from the same source on officer producing stamp of old book.

The Paymaster's office will be open for the transaction of cash business during such hours as may be determined upon by Force Commander, and published by him in orders.

4. The maximum amount of the advance, and the number of advances in any one calendar month will be as follows :-

2/Lieut.	3 advances of £4 or equivalent.
Officers below Field Rank.	3 advances of £5 or equivalent.
Officer Lt and above Field Rank	3 advances of £10 or equivalent.

5. Officers will be especially careful to ensure that before presenting A.F. W 3241 for payment the form is completed in all respects. This is of importance in the Officers' own interests.

## DOCUMENT NO. 3

SECRET.5 Apr 40.

Copy No.1.

148 INFANTRY BRIGADE - OPERATION INSTRUCTION No.1.1. General policy.

The intention of STAFFORDS is to effect a landing at 512, 547 and 548, and to occupy these ports with a view to denying them to Germany.

It is anticipated that our assistance will be welcomed by the inhabitants, but the decision as to whether or not to land will rest with the R.Navy.

2. Intention.

It is the intention of 547 to effect a landing as directed by the R.Navy and to place the following in a state of defence :-

- (a) the harbour and quayside.
- (b) The aerodrome at SOLA. *NORTH OF*
- (c) The seaplane station 1 1/2 miles *W* SOLA.

3. Possible enemy action.

The main opposition can only be expected in the first instance from enemy air action, which might be directed against the force while actually landing.

In such eventuality the landing would be covered by the R.Navy. As soon as troops have disembarked they will be responsible for their own protection, and it is essential that, whether the enemy is active or not, troops are moved off from the quayside to their Bn assembly areas with the least possible delay.

It is also possible that while a landing can be effected at the harbour, the enemy may forestall one occupation of the aerodrome, in which case immediate action will be taken to capture the aerodrome.

A. Assembly Areas.

In whatever order the force may be put ashore, unit Commanders will assemble their Bns as follows :-

Sde H.Q. and 55 Pz Coy R.L.	PARK immed. S. of CATHEDRAL.
3th Foresters.	HOSPITAL.
5th Leicesters.	Gas WORKS.

Plns. should be moved off from the quayside as complete. As soon as Bn H.Q. are established a liaison officer will be sent to Sde.H.Q.

B. Aerodrome and Seaplane Base. 8th Foresters.

8th Foresters will be prepared to move at once to SOLA without waiting for transport or stores. It is of vital importance that the aerodrome should be secured on the same day as the landing takes place.

A small rear party can be left at the Bn assembly point to guard such stores as cannot be carried on the men during the march. These stores will be brought out to SOLA as soon as Transport can be collected.

On arrival at SOLA at least one Coy must be in position continuously from which fire can be directed on to the Aerodrome.

At the Seaplane Base it will probably be sufficient to arrange for continuous ~~gun~~ observation, provided communications are good and there is a reserve at hand.

2.

1

6. Harbour guards. 1/5th Leicesters.

Without reason the number of pickets required for local defence cannot be estimated. It is intended to keep the posts at a minimum and maintain the remainder of the Bn as a reserve to the force.

7. A/A action.

Although sketches are available showing hostile aircraft, it is a matter of experience to distinguish friend from foe in the air.

The following order will be observed throughout the force

No fire will be opened against any aircraft unless

- (a) Hostile markings are visible.
- (b) The aircraft is taking hostile action.

8. Administration.

- (a) Rations (boxes of 12 rations) to be carried ashore and taken to Bn assembly areas.
- (b) Small baggage parties to be retained and left at the quayside to collect together unit stores as they are off loaded.
- (c) Capt. Wilson to arrange the line of transport.  
Capt. Tandy " " purchase of rations, and the siting of a supply store shed.  
S.M.O. to arrange with civil hospital authorities.
- (d) Capt. Larsen to work in the first instance with Capt. Tandy and Capt. Wilson. Additional interpreters will be obtained as soon as possible.
- (e) Staff Captain to make enquiries regarding billeting facilities.

BARNARD CASTLE.

*[Signature]*  
Major.  
Brigade Major, 148th (M.) Infantry Brigade.

Distribution.

1/5th Leicesters.  
3th Foresters.  
55th Pz Coy. R.E.  
Brigadier Phillips.  
Brigade Commander.  
Brigade Major  
File.  
War Diary (2)

## Copy No.

1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
7.  
8 and 9.

FACSIMILES OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS A23

April 7th 1940.

S E C R E T

8/SF/SY/13

8th BATTN. THE SHERWOOD FORESTERS.

Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_

OPERATION ORDERS.

## DOCUMENT NO. 4

1. GENERAL POLICY.

The intention of the Strafford Forces is to effect a landing at 512, 547, and 546 and to occupy these ports with a view to denying them to Germany.

It is anticipated that our assistance will be welcomed by the inhabitants but the decision as to whether or not to land will rest with the Royal Navy.

2. INTENTION.

It is the intention of 547 to effect a landing as directed by the Royal Navy and to place the following in a state of defence

- (a) The harbour and quayside
- (b) The aerodrome at SOLA
- (c) The seaplane station  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles north of SOLA

3. POSSIBLE ENEMY ACTION.

The main opposition can only be expected in the first instance from enemy air action, which might be directed against the force while actually landing.

In such eventuality the landing will be covered by the Royal Navy. As soon as troops have disembarked they will be responsible for their own protection, and it is essential that, whether the enemy is active or not, troops are moved off from the quay side to their Bn. Assembly Area with the least possible delay.

It is also possible that while a landing can be effected at the harbour, the enemy may forestall our occupation of the aerodrome in which case immediate action will be taken to capture the aerodrome.

4. Special instructions have been issued for DISEMBARKATION.

5. ASSEMBLY AREA.

- (a) 8 Foresters - Hospital
- (b) Bde H.Q. - Park immediately south of Cathedral

The Bn. will move from the quayside by complete platoons. Bn H.Qs. will be established at Hospital in first instance Lt. R. Bradley will act as Liaison Officer and will report to Brigade when Bn. Headquarters has been established.

6. AERODROME AND SEAPLANE BASE.

8 Foresters will be prepared to move at once to Sola without waiting Transport or Stores.

7. ORDER OF MARCH, FROM ASSEMBLY AREA.

- "D" Coy. Adv. Gd. to Bn.
- "C" Coy. Bn. HQ.
- No. 1. Platoon.
- No. 2. Platoon, plus three Brens and Carrier Pl. personnel
- No. 5. Platoon.
- No. 6. Platoon.
- "A" Coy.
- "B" Coy.

# FACSIMILES OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS A25

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8. (a) The AERODROME will be secured by the Adv. Gd. Coy.  
(b) "C" Coy. will establish an observation post on the SEAPLANE BASE  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles NORTH of SOLA.  
(c) Final Dispositions for the security of the AERODROME at SOLA, and the SEAPLANE BASE NORTH of SOLA will be made as soon as possible after the seizure of same has been effected.
9. 1/5th Leicesters are reserve Bn. to the force and are to occupy the PORT of STAVANGER.
10. A/A ACTION.  
Bren Guns will be sited and mounted for A.A. action as quickly as possible on the securing of the AERODROME and SEAPLANE BASE.  
The following order will be observed throughout:-  
NO fire will be opened against any aircraft unless (a) Hostile markings are visible. (b) The aircraft are taking hostile action.
11. GREAT CARE AND RESTRAINT will be exercised if any encounter with the INHABITANTS of the country.  
Resort to force in the form of using lethal weapons will only be used in the event of extreme necessity.
12. ADMINISTRATION.
  - (a) Lieut. and Q.M. Halem is detailed as Baggage Officer.  
This officer will also be responsible for the Brigade Staff baggage.  
2/Lt. Blackburn is detailed as Assistant Baggage Officer.  
No. 3. Platoon will act as Baggage Party.  
All baggage and Unit Stores will be collected and taken to a Rendezvous to be selected by the Baggage Officer.
  - (b) The Medical Officer will liaise with the M.O. of the Leicesters for the purpose of making arrangements with the Civil Medical Authorities and proceed with the Unit to SOLA.
  - (c) ARMAMENTS  
50 Rounds bandolier packed will be carried by all Ranks armed with a rifle. Bren Guns: Each with 750 Rounds loaded into magazines of 25 Rounds each distributed between the personnel of the sections.
  - (d) RATIONS.  
A haversack ration will be issued by the Royal Navy before leaving the ship.  
One days emergency rations issued to all Ranks today, these emergency/will NOT be opened until ordered by the Commanding Officer.  
Water bottles will be filled before leaving this ship.
  - (e) DRESS.  
All Ranks will parade in fighting order wearing leather jerkins and steel helmet. The greatcoat will be carried rolled and fastened with pack straps.
  - (f) KITBAGS AND PACKS.  
These will be labelled with the man's name, platoon and Company and will be collected under Company arrangements and stacked as ordered by the Royal Navy.
  - (g) Bn. TOOLS, and FIELD WORK STORES.  
All Unit digging tools and allotted sandbags will be sent forward by the first available transport.  
The Quartermaster is made absolutely responsible for this.

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13. INTERCOMMUNICATION.  
Two Signallers with bicycles to each Company.

*W. J. MacKenzie*

Adjutant.

Aboard  
H.M.S. Glasgow.DISTRIBUTION.

C.2.  
2 in C.  
Adjutant.  
O.C. "H" Coy.  
O.C. "A" "  
O.C. "B" "  
O.C. "C" "  
O.C. "D" "  
G.H.  
Ass. Baggage Officer (Blackburn)  
Liaison Officer  
H.O.  
Signals Officer  
War Diary.

|| Capt n H.M.S. Glasgow  
Comd der H.M.S. Glasgow



**DOCUMENT NO. 5**

**I. STRENGTH RETURN ON EMBARKATION & DISEMBARKATION** of 15 Dec. Henderson's Regt.

(Serial No. 15453.6.) on moving from Ruby Centre (Savannah) Feb April 1946 to STRAFFORD (Field Force or Station).

To be rendered by Officers Commanding units for complete lists, portions of a unit, or drafts (of a strength of 17 or over (d)) for embarkation. A separate form to be rendered for all parties if Reconnaissance or Advanced Party; this should be stated.

(Complete units portion of unit, as date) (b), sextuple and landed to Embarkation Staff Officer at port of embarkation) (c).

DETAIL	Personnel (of which a complete nominal roll must be rendered at Part III of this Return).										Animals	Tons d.w. (e).	REMARKS (including full particulars of any casualties).
	Officers.	Warrant Officers.	S/Sergeants & Sergeants.	Trumpeters & Drummers.	Corporals.	Privates.	Total Other Ranks.	CAVANS.	Total All Ranks.	S.A.A.			
Strength as embarked for port of embarkation --	1.		1.		7.	30	58	16	74				
Casualties en route for port of embarkation --													
Strength actually EMBARKED -	1		1		7	40	58	16	114				
Casualties during the sea voyage --													
Strengthened/dismarked for service --													

Extreme accuracy is to be observed in the compilation and amendment of this return. It will be signed as follows:—  
 (i) By O.C. with forwarding return. (ii) By the Embarkation Staff Officer at the port of embarkation. (iii) On disembarkation, by O.C. unit or Commanding Officer (in the case of shore sea voyage). (iv) By the Embarkation Staff Officer at the port of disembarkation.  
 The particulars required below will be entered by the Embarkation Staff Officers.

EMBARKED at Smith per S.S. ACORN on 17 Feb Capt 1946.

DISEMBARKED at \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_

Signature:—  
 (i) Wynne Smith S.O. / Wynne Smith S.O. (Port of disembarkation).  
 (ii) Robert Smith S.O. / Robert Smith S.O. (Port of disembarkation).  
 (iii) \_\_\_\_\_  
 (iv) \_\_\_\_\_

(a) To be disposed of as set out overhead.  
 (b) On disembarkation from U.K., if unit is allotted to the Field Force, this number (as laid down in Information Tables) should be used.  
 (c) For return to the War Office (Embarkation Card) will be used.  
 (d) In these columns will be entered the weights of accompanied stores, equipment, etc., which are not shipped loaded in vehicles, and which will therefore require transport on landing.

## II. WAR OUTFIT OF UNIT.

In all cases where personnel of the unit accompany mechanical vehicles, guns, etc., TO THE PORT, details of such vehicles, etc., will be entered on this part of the Return. Entries and amendments must be as accurate as for those in Part I.

Normally, mechanical vehicles will be embarked in ships separate from personnel, and Part II of this form will be the official record of mechanical vehicles only as far as the port of embarkation, while Parts I and III of this form will continue to be the official return for personnel as far as the port of disembarkation.

When mechanical vehicles are embarked separately as described above, the columns referring to these vehicles will be endorsed by the Embarkation Staff "Embarked separately in M.T. ships." If for tactical or other reasons, mechanical vehicles are carried in the same ship as the personnel, this return will support both personnel and vehicles to the port of disembarkation.

DETAIL.	H.D. Vehicles.		Guns, Carriages, Limbers, etc. (describe).	Ammunition Wagons & Limbers	Motor Trucks, Motor Cyclists, etc.	Mechanical vehicles (describe) & Trailers.	Bicycles.	REMARKS (including particulars of replacement of vehicle casualties at port of embarkation).
	2-wheeled.	4-wheeled.						
Strength as estimated or pro- ceeding by road to port of shipment								
Casualties en route to port of shipment								
Numbers actually handed over for loading								

**INSTRUCTIONS AS TO DISPOSAL.**

**All six copies of this form are to be handed to Embarkation Staff Officer at port of embarkation and disposed of as under.**

Three copies to be retained by Embarkation Staff Officer at port of embarkation, one of which is to be forwarded to the War Office (Q.M.G.18) as soon as the vessel has sailed, one retained as port record, and one copy retained for immediate despatch to the port to which the vessel was proceeding in the event of the vessel being lost at sea.

Three copies, after signature, to be handed back to Officer Commanding unit or Conducting Officer (in the case of a short sea voyage), or delivered to O.C. Troops on board (long sea voyage), for custody in both cases. The officer who has charge of the documents during the voyage will be responsible for handing them—daily assembled as regards casualties, etc.—to the Embarkation Staff Officer at the port of disembarkation, who will retain one copy and forward one copy each to the War Office (Q.M.G.18) and D.A.C., 2nd Echelon, respectively.

### **III. NOMINAL ROLL (To include all ranks).**

To be continued on the back of this form and, if necessary, on additional sheets in manuscript.  
The greatest care is to be observed in the compilation and amendment of this roll.

Army Number.	Rank.	Initials	Surname.	<p>If proceeding on transfer to another Regt., or Corps, the fact should be stated and the designation of the unit given here.</p> <p>If not actually belonging to the unit rendering this form, the fact should be stated and the unit from which detached, etc., should be given here.</p>
<u>OFFICERS.</u>				
---	2/Lieut.	W. H.	Sullivan J.	
<u>WARRANT OFFICERS.</u>				

## III. NOMINAL ROLL (Contd.)

Army Number	Rank	Initials	Surname	If proceeding on transfer to another Regt., or Corps, the fact should be stated and the designation of the unit given here. If not actually belonging to the unit rendering this form, the fact should be stated and the unit from which detached, etc., should be given here.
OTHER RANKS (Alphabetically by Squadron, Company, etc.)				
4853999.	Op.	W.T.	Arthur.	
4857397.	Pte.		Arthur.	
4859712.	"		Palmer.	
4858223.	"		William.	
4859158.	N/Cpl.	D.F.	Yackel.	
4855571.	Pte.		James.	
4858364.	1/Sgt.		Prickett.	
4858317.	Op.	H.	Chambers.	
4858060.	Pte.		Clay.	
4859640.	"		Clamp.	
4859677.	"		Brownlow.	
4859691.	Sgt.		Quarke.	
4858741.	Op.		William.	
4859287.	"		Henry.	
4859510.	Pte.		Wallis.	
4861244.	"		Jackson.	

## DOCUMENT NO. 6

Sat. Apr. 6<sup>th</sup> Cockfield Bell Sta

Sun. Apr. 7<sup>th</sup> 1000 hrs Rorysth, on to  
HMS Dorsetshire. V. g. to Staranga

Mon. Apr. 8<sup>th</sup> 1100 hrs "All knots  
disembark at the double". Dinner in  
dockyard. Cheer departure of ship, 1330 hrs  
March 8 miles (uphill) to Camp 3  
beyond Dunfermline

Tues. Apr. 9<sup>th</sup> Easy day. Foot washing in  
stream

Wed. Apr. 10<sup>th</sup> Another easy day, with  
some sports

Thurs. Apr. 11<sup>th</sup> Easy morning. Pay in the  
afternoon, visit to Dunfermline  
allowed

Friday Apr. 12 Morning Route March  
Afternoon "Evening leave again"  
Cancelled at once "Standby"  
Evening, order to move

Saturday Apr. 13 0810 March out of  
Camp to Rorysth dock, on to lighters,  
on to S.S. Orion. Confusion over  
stores, loaded separately. On board  
(after 4 attempts to come alongside)  
about 1700 hrs. Luxury

## DOCUMENT NO. 7

From Admiralty

To British Consul, Narvik 2005

British Consular Officer, NARVIK repeated  
Naval Attaché's OSNO from D.N.1. Please  
report by telegraph harbour facilities  
of the port of NARVIK including following  
details :-

- (a) length of quays
- (b) depth of water alongside
- (c) height of quays above high water
- (d) number of cranes or other facilities  
for unloading ships
- (e) number and dimensions any

Transit sheds

- (f) number of rail approaches to quays
- (g) whether there is any flat ground  
in the immediate neighbourhood harbour
- (h) dimensions of reported aerodromes  
SKATORRA and TARDUFUSS
- (i) whether there are any roads to these  
aerodromes ☉

Use great discretion in making  
your investigations and repeat your  
telegraphic reports to Naval Attaché's  
OSNO.

T.O.R. 0930/30      T.O.O. 2018/20/12/39

## DOCUMENT NO. 8

To Conrad Cumming, British Consulate, Tromsø 20930  
Can you give me following information regarding  
reported aerodromes at SKATØRRA and  
BARBUFOSS @ approximate dimensions @  
whether any roads lead to them @ are  
both available for land machines @ distance  
from TROMSØ and NARVIK @ Please treat  
as extremely confidential. GIBBS.

T.O.O. 1724/31/12/39

## DOCUMENT NO. 9

From TromsøTo British Consul, Narvik 14173

Yours 1724 of 31st December @ KRATØYRA

is a Norwegian naval seaplane base situated on Tromsø island about 4 miles north by road from the centre of town @ There is no landing ground for land machines and the hangars are not yet completed, seaplanes lying at mooring buoys. Hangar erections is to accommodate 16 seaplanes @

BARDESS is a Norwegian military air station situated some 45 miles Northward of NARVIK by road and about 80 miles Southward of Tromsø by road @ Dimensions landing ground unknown.

T.O.R. 1430/2 T.O.O. 1010/2/1/40



## DOCUMENT NO. 10

To British Legation, Oslo

To Admiralty, London 22280

Admiralty (for D.N.I.) repeated to Naval  
Attache' Oslo your 2018 29. December ©

Oke quay (a) about 1200 feet

(b) 26 feet at low water

(c) 30 feet at high water ;

not suitable for discharging cargo but  
troops could be landed there ©

Harbour jetty (a) 400 feet

(b) 29 feet at low water outside,  
only 18 feet inside jetty

(c) 8 feet at high water

(d) none

(e) 2 store sheds 45 by 8 yards  
and 50 by 8 yards respectively, 2  
floors each

(f) single line piers across inshore  
end of quay ©

FAGERNES quay (a) 550 feet

(b) 21 feet at low water

(c) 6 feet at high water

(d) One 20 ton electric crane

(e) 190 by 21 metres, 2 floors

(f) double line alongside ship © 2  
separate single lines connect them to  
main line also sidings abreast quay ©

(g) no

(h) SKATØRRA is naval seaplane base  
on TRONSO Island 4 miles north of  
town by road © No landing ground  
there © Hangars to accommodate  
16 seaplanes not yet completed,  
planes flying at buoy © BARDUFOS

## BRITAIN'S DESIGNS ON NORWAY

is military air station 45 miles  
northward of NARVIK by road and 80  
miles southward of TRONSF by road;  
exact dimensions unknown but reported  
to be not less than 600 metres each  
way.

Understand railway tunnels do not  
permit transport of aeroplanes.

Information from British ~~Emb~~ Consuls  
at NARVIK and TRONSF.

T.O.O. 1929/2 1/49

DOCUMENT NO. 11

From Admiralty  
To British Consul, Narvik 11201  
 British Consul, Narvik from Admiralty  
 (D.N.I.) Request immediate details  
 of NARVIK electric power supply  
 including voltage and frequency  
 T.O.R. 1930/3 T.O.O. 1337/3/1/40

DOCUMENT NO. 12

To Admiralty, London 23471  
 Admiralty (for D.N.I.) Your 1337 3rd January  
 2 water power stations for town supply  
 (i) NYGAARDS Station 8 miles E.N.E 10  
 thousand horse power (ii) HAARVIKDAL  
 3 miles South 3 thousand horse power.  
 also Ore Company reserve Diesel plant  
 10 thousand horse power @ 11.50 periods  
 and 220 volts @  
 Norwegian railway also worked from  
 NYGAARDS Station except in Joranger when  
 power supplied from FORVUS Station Sweden.  
 T.O.O. 1913/4/1/40

## DOCUMENT NO. 13

To Admiralty, London 30258

To British Legation, Oslo

Admiralty (for D.N.I.) repeated to Naval  
Attaché Oslo. following movements of  
Norwegian troops have taken place  
12th. Jan. 1000 G.M.T. about 400 troops  
landed from mail steamer 13th. Jan.  
0200 G.M.T. 2 steamers about 1500  
tons called redistributed the troops  
they were carrying and proceeded  
to the Northward numbers unknown  
all other troops came from the East.

T.O.O. 1225/13/1/40

DOCUMENT NO. 14

To Consul Cumming British Consulate, Tromsø 30332  
 Can you inform me whether any ships  
 passed Tromsø this morning Saturday  
 with Norwegian troops. — British Consul, Narvik  
 T.O.O. 1529/13 1/40

DOCUMENT NO. 15

From Tromsø  
To British Consul, Narvik 14403  
 Your 1529 13th. January I have no information  
 about this and personally saw nothing during  
 daylight hours. There is however a constant  
 stream of troops northward by mail Alcares  
 T.O.R. 2100/13 T.O.O. 2024/13 1/40

## DOCUMENT NO. 16

From British Consul Bergen S.T.C.  
 To British Consul Narvik  
 Reference Memo N1 (v) Para 54 (v) © Please report by telegraph  
 direct to S.N.I. present position of Norwegian War Vessels in zone  
 area and also future movements ©  
 T.O.R. 1601/3/4. T.O.O. 1330/3/4/40

## DOCUMENT NO. 17

From Admiralty S.T.C.  
 To British Consul Narvik  
 Reference Memo N1 (v) Para 54 (i) © Please report by telegraph  
 present position of Norwegian War Vessels in zone area and also future movements  
 T.O.R. 0825/3/4/40. T.O.O. 1616/2

## DOCUMENT NO. 18

From Admiral 97032

To Consul Narvik

From Admiralty N. C. L. Roseberry has been appointed to Narvik as British Consul. He leaves United Kingdom by air on the 8<sup>th</sup> April. N. Roseberry has been appointed Consul at Narvik for special reasons. His appointment does not reflect upon the manner in which you have hitherto performed your duties which has given complete satisfaction and you should continue to take charge of Naval Control duties at Narvik.

T.O. R 0930/7/4

T.O. 1925/6/4/40

## DOCUMENT NO. 19

BRITISH LEGATION,  
STOCKHOLM.14<sup>th</sup> Feb? 40

Dear Consul-Captain -

This is firstly to introduce my confidential clerk, Baxter, whom I recommend to your mercy -

He brings with him a questionnaire which will provide much fun and jollity for the long winter evenings.

The orders from the Admiralty are that this is to be got through jilki jilki regardless of expense. I suggest, therefore, that you send one of your bright boys on to Tromsø with his packet and that he should wait there for the answer and bring it back to you. Then you will send Smith, e.g., down to me with your answer and Tromsø's, carrying the envelope under his shirt, for the fact of carrying a letter must not be known. In the meantime you will be obtaining a Swedish visa for Smith, e.g. for aller et retour and if there is any trouble about this



please. let me know by telegram - the reason for the visa to be vacation of course, and it should be valid for at least four days as the journey takes two.

I am instructing haxton to obtain information as to question 11 on his way - I rather think that Oslo has the answer to 13 but anything you know to confirm may be useful -

How you are going to answer the others is not known to yourself but don't get yourself shot. if you can help it

Best love to you all, haxton will give you all the news -

Yours John G. Doland -

May I have my notes back - please? They are urgently needed here

A44

BRITAIN'S DESIGNS ON NORWAY

DOCUMENT NO. 20

(S/S/00) (S165) Wt. 50486/0155 40s 12/00 S.E.R. Ltd. Gp. 071.

ADMIRALTY.

REFERENCE SHEET.

From **Director of Naval Intelligence**

To

Senior Naval Control Service  
Officer,  
Narvik.

Dated **31st January** 1940

Information required, or notified.

Replies to the questions in the attached questionnaire are requested as soon as possible. It would be convenient if items of information were forwarded, with reference to the relevant paragraphs, as they are obtained. It should be emphasised that no attempt to gather information should in any way compromise your position or arouse local suspicion. Much of that concerning port facilities, which is more urgently required, would no doubt become accessible during the course of ordinary work.

(Sgd.) GEOFFREY COOKE.

For D.N.I.

## DOCUMENT NO. 21

Information required on NARVIK.

1. Can up-to-date and detailed plans of the town and port be obtained locally?
2. It was reported 2 years ago that considerable port development was to be expected in the near future. Information as to how far, if at all, this development has proceeded is required, together with available details regarding plans for the future.
3. What is the present population of Narvik?  
*10,000*
4. Detailed information about the facilities, lay-out and present or proposed use of the Naval Base at RAMSUND is particularly required.
5. Details are required of the exact repair and other facilities available at the LUOSSAVARA - KERUNAVADRA A/B (L.K.A.B.) yard.
6. Information is required regarding coal supplies:-
  - (a) Number and location of stores.
  - (b) Present or normal stocks.
  - (c) Maximum storage capacity.

7. Information is required regarding oil supplies:-
  - (a) Nature of oil.
  - (b) Number and location of tanks.
  - (c) Present or normal stocks.
  - (d) Maximum storage capacity.
  
8. What signal facilities (telephone, telegraph, etc.) are available?
  
  
9. With regard to the defences of Narvik:-
  - (a) Can you confirm that 5 guns are placed above RAMSUND, near the entrance to the OFOTEN FJORD, and state exact positions?
  - (b) Can you give details regarding calibre, range and arcs of fire of guns.
  - (c) Can you confirm that the defence of Narvik is one mobile battery of 4 A/A guns, Bofors type, and give details.
  - (d) Can you confirm that Narvik will be, or is, defended by a coast defence vessel with 20 cm. guns in Vest Fjord?
  
10. Information is required regarding coastal reconnaissance, with a view to landings, raids, etc.

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11. Would you confirm that the railway between Narvik and RIKSGRANSEN could easily be sabotaged. If so, details of the points at which it is vulnerable are required.

12. What harbour craft are available locally, particularly lighters, barges and tugs?

13. ADDENDUM.

Can you confirm that there is a mine depot on the mainland at KIRKENES, and that mine-laying vessels are in the vicinity awaiting orders to establish a minefield?

## DOCUMENT NO. 22

O. - - - - -

20 8 1940

No 40 1940

N O T E

- - - -

P O N T

Monsieur le Capitaine de Vaisseau  
Chef de P. M. T. S.

O B J E T : Envoi de renseignements sur la Norvège.

R E P O N S E : Votre Questionnaire No 1/40 du 29 Janvier 1940  
Vos télégrammes Nos 1038 du 26 Janvier 1940  
1137 du 21 Janvier 1940  
Ma Note No 44 "M" du 30 Janvier 1940

- 1/- J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre questionnaire No 1/40 du 29 Janvier.
- 2/- Il ne m'est pas possible de recueillir sur place à Oslo tous les éléments de réponse nécessaires et je vais dans ce but entreprendre immédiatement un rapide voyage à Trondheim et à Narvik ( 8 à 10 jours environ ).
- 3/- Je vous adresse, en attendant l'envoi de l'étude générale que je ferai au retour de ce voyage les renseignements particuliers suivants qui permettront avec ceux déjà joints à ma note 44 "M" du 30 Janvier 1940 de se faire une idée des possibilités des ports en question et de leurs moyens d'évacuation

D I S T R I B U T I O N :

1. - 5. - 3. - (1, 2 et 3)

C o p i e :

1. - 5. - 3. - 1. - (4)

S I G N A T U R E

3/- La question leur étant présentée sous la forme d'envoi de matériel en Finlande et malgré les avantages offerts par le port de Bergen pour un débarquement rapide les militaires norvégiens le déconseillaient formellement en raison du long trajet par voie ferrée et des complications qui en résulteraient. Seuls les ports du fjord de Trondheim et le port de Narvik seraient à leur avis pratiques pour une telle opération. Mais l'utilisation de ces ports pose une question de tonnage - Celui-ci paraissait devoir alors être limité suivant les ports entre 8 et 12000 tonnes maximum.

6/- Les militaires norvégiens estiment à 30 kilomètres la vitesse horaire moyenne de leurs transports par voie ferrée en sur opérations.

7/- Observations diverses :

4/- Les cartes de Norvège commandées par votre télégramme No 1187 du 11 Janvier 1940 ont été approvisionnées dans le commerce local avant l'arrivée de votre questionnaire - Ces achats effectués chez des marchands différents n'ont pu en aucune façon susciter le moindre soupçon ou commentaire. Je ne suis abstenue d'acheter les cartes de Suède indiquées; elle me paraissent en effet d'après le catalogue joint devoir être à peu près les mêmes que celles publiées par notre Service Hydrographique.

## DOCUMENT NO. 23

SHIPPING FACILITIES ALONG THE  
TRONDHEIM FJORD.1. TRONDHEIM harbour proper.

This harbour consists of two basins, SRATTOLKEN and NYHAVEN.

SRATTOLKEN is the main harbour but only has one quay for deep water ships. There are six quays all told, each suitable for ships with a draught of 20 to 22 feet. A quay to give a draught of 28 feet is being rapidly extended.

NYHAVEN is mainly a coal-importing harbour. There is only 24 feet alongside each quay.

2. PORTS ALONG THE FJORD.

These are FOLLEFOSS, BALN, STENKJAER, LANGSTEN, MURVIK, HOM-ELVIK, ELVIK and THAMSHAVE.

FOLLEFOSS is 120 miles by road from Trondheim and lies off the railway. It is mainly used for wood pulp ships.

BALN lies 110 miles by road from Trondheim. Has one wharf equipped for the loading of iron ore and takes ships up to 8,000 tons.

LANGSTEN is 50 miles from Trondheim and lies on the direct railway route to Sweden, has an excellent deep water quay. Ideal place for secret landings. Is often used as a wood pulp port.

MURVIK about 20 miles from Trondheim has a loading quay used mainly for carbide and wood pulp. Is on the direct line to Sweden, but anything going on there can easily be observed.

HOM-ELVIK 15 miles east of Trondheim with 26 feet alongside. Timber exporting port.



## DOCUMENT NO. 24

2.

Question A(cont).

BRITISH CONSULAR SHIPPING OFFICE  
FJORDGATEN 23 - TRONDHJEM  
TEL. B. 6160

## IN ILÆVIKBUGTEN

	Depth	Length
Kooperative Soc'y Jetty (2 hauling-off buoys)	21ft	194ft
Pier		
Ore <del>quay</del> (Kiskaen) (2 hauling-off buoys)	32	piles -conveyor band footbridge.
B.P.Oil Depot Jetty (2 hauling-off buoys)	Over 30 (?)	10 ft(pipe line and footbridge)
Shell Oil Depot quay (No buoy - tankers anchor and drop stern near)	Over 30 (?)	30 ft
Standard Oil Quay (1 hauling-off buoy for stern - ships anchor)	Over 30 (?)	150ft
Nordenfjeldske Quay (No buoy - tankers anchor and drop stern near)	Over 30 (?)	30ft

The above-mentioned 6 jettées and quays in Ilævikbugten are well-suited to disembarkation of personnel - and are well protected from all but North-easterly winds - when big ships might have difficulties there.

## DOCUMENT NO. 25

*Utenriksdepartementet*

Oslo, 17 februar 1940.

Strengt fortrolig.

MED SVAR BES OPPGITT

J.nr.

Herr Statsministeren.


Samarbeid mellom Finnland og England.  
Norges stilling.

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Jeg har den ære å meddele at legasjonen  
i Stockholm i en fortrolig innberetning av 16.ds. har  
meddelt følgende :

" Jeg har på annen hånd fra oberst Bratt  
brakt i erfaring at det ventes at det i morgen vil  
bli inngått en avtale mellom England og Finnland. Det  
antas at den engelske forutsetning går ut på på samme  
tid å foreta landsetting i Bergen, Trondheim og Narvik.  
Man tror at Churchill under hensyntagen til issituasjon-  
en i Öresund og de vanskeligheter som en større del  
av Tysklands flåte vil ha med å iverksette gjennomgang,  
vil gjennomføre denne aksjon så snart som mulig.

For Utenriksministeren :



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*foruten*

## DOCUMENT NO. 26

*Utenriksdepartementet*

Oslo, 17. februar 1940.

Strengt fortrolig.

2

MED SVAR BES OPPGITT  
J.nr.

Herr Statsministeren.

Krigen Finnland-Sovjetsamveldet.  
Sveriges stilling.  
-----

Jeg har den ære å meddele at legasjonen  
i Stockholm i en fortrolig innberetning av 16.ds. har  
meddelt følgende :

" Etter uttalelse som i ettermiddag falt  
fra hold innen det svenske utenriksdepartement skulle  
det ikke være inntruffet noe egentlig nytt i det forhold  
som allerede i noen tid har hersket, nemlig at Finnland  
påpeker at det er nødvendig å få militær hjelp og at  
man på svensk side vil søke utvidet den frivillige hjelp  
men holde fast ved nøytraliteten. "

For Utenriksministeren :



## DOCUMENT NO. 27

Te A kort ref.

Regi konferansen 2/3 u. 18.

3

Uttusikkom. meddelte at den engelske minister h. 3 idag hadde meddelt at de allierte vil sende tropper til hjelp for Finnland, og at disse vil hjelpe måtte manjere gjennom Norge og Sverige. ~~Engelske~~ ~~Uttusikkom.~~ var foreløpig. Det ville komme offisielt formell melding, med forespørsel om gjennommarsjen skulle, eller at det var gitt foreløpig svar derfra. -

Uttusikministeren hadde svart at saken i alle tilfelle - eller at den hadde vært drøftet i regjeringen og utusikkomiteen måtte forelegges for Stortinget, for uten dette godkjenning kunne fremmede makters tropper ikke passere gjennom landet, også den franske minister hadde sagt utusikministeren, og gav en avg. etter at den

Uttusikkom. hadde konferert med den svenske utusikkomiteen, og utusikråd Bull skal reise til Stockholm i kveld for på stedet å få greie på den svenske regjeringens utusikkomite, og på konferere om formen for svar på henvedelsen fra den engelske regjering.

Uttusikministeren refererte et utkast til svar til Englands, end Lovet viser til den norske regjeringens nøytrale stilling, og holder fast ved denne. Den norske regjering vil ikke frivillig la seg ~~gaa inn i en europeisk krig, og~~ ~~gaa inn i en krig~~ ~~for~~ landet til krigsskuleplass for stormaktens troppstyrker.

Nat. komiteen var enig i dette svar

Enn liket, men hvis må de engelske og franske kommisjoner ikke vil, skal vi da nøye oss med å protestere, eller ta forbeholdene til å binde gjennommarsjen.

Kohl mente at vi måtte være oss med å protestere, - vi må ikke stille oss slik at vi kommer inn i krig på feil side, men vi ikke kan innta å komme med.

Thorsd mente at vi måtte følge samme vei som Sverige

Kohl var enig i det, men etter det som foreligger er den svenske regjering bestemt mot.

Lia: Vi må være oppmerksom på at det kommer et dødt. Hvis England må ikke sende hjelp til Finnland, fordi Sverige og Norge setter seg mot gjennommarsjen, hva da? Kan det ikke være et politisk spill, for å skape ansvaret for Finnlands nedbrytning på Norge og Sverige. Bull har ikke reist med et forslag om å protestere. Vi må ta endelig stilling til saken på mandag.

Kohl: Enn, hvis Sverige går med, kan vi ikke innta det.

Hindetal:

Statsministeren har fortælt det slik at min Beell skal reise, så min kan reise med den norske regjeringens standpunkt, men selv-  
følgelig for å drøfte dette med den svenske regjering. - Det går  
fredsrykten, og det er visstnok noe i disse rykten. - Gått faste  
gjennom de siste dager. Dette som de foreligger kan være et diplo-  
matisk trekk for å hinte at det blir fred i Finnland, - et forslag  
på å utvide de allierte front. - En vi med på dette, så er vi  
i krig med både Russland og Tyskland. Jeg mener vi må være  
neutrale, og svare nei selv om Sverige beslutter seg til å si ja. Det  
er spesielt forhold i Sverige, og det kan tenkes at Sverige nå sier ja.  
Men vi må først se på saken. Beell kommer tilbake på mandag  
da må vi også drøfte saken med Christen.

Torje meddelte at på Internasjonale møte hadde Leon Blum  
 sagt at troppen skal fortsette i Frankrike, og ville reise til Finnland  
 etter oppmøte derfra, - og at i mellom norske krone var kjøpt opp til å  
 gjeve med forsynings her. Blum uttalte at dette var en utakt stand-  
 punkt. Vi må holde oss adgangen åpen til å svare ja på  
 mandag, selv om vi nå svare nei, - hvis Sverige sier ja. -  
 En så viktig sak kan vi drøfte med Centralstyret, for vi går til utenlands-  
 komiteen.

Kohle vi må gi vårt standpunkt til Sverige, men holde oss  
 adgangen åpen til å følge Sverige som de sier ja.

Det er sagt at den svenske regjering står delt i saken, - de som  
 de norske regjeringer svare nei. - Med hensyn til fredsrykten  
 så vil jeg at det er to ~~svenske~~ retninger i den svenske regjering.  
 Det er en fraksjon som mener at Finnland bli på med på  
 en fred på grunnlag av Russland krav.

Nordisk fredsadvokat vil antagelig bli godt mottatt i Russland,  
 men ikke et tryk deltar i den retning.

På forespørsel av Wald, opplyste Kohle at grunnmen til at  
 Sveriges svarte nei til Finnland, var ~~gjennom~~ men at Sverige  
 ikke ville bli blandet inn i striden.

Ljungberg mente vi skulle bli se for mørkt enn for lysh  
 på situasjonen. Sier Sverige ja, så må vi si det samme.  
 Den pol. situasjonen i Italia er spent, de har foretatt seg  
 på at vi ikke kan gjøre sikker regning på å få krigsleveranser  
 de fra.

Lei: Vi må ikke risikere at også den svenske regjering i tilfelle  
 kan si nei til den norske regjeringens standpunkt, og si at de kan  
 heller ikke vi.

Hjelmstedt: Utvilsomt vil reise med den norske regjeringens standpunkt  
 som den eneste å drøfte med den svenske regjering. Standpunktet min

er ta i jellies shop, og haede av adgang til a tar endelig  
slutpunkt på mandag. Forøvrigt helt enig med statsministeren.  
Ward. V. må treffe sin egen avgjørelse, men endelig først  
etter at vi får grunn på forhandlingene i Sverige.

Statsministeren presiserte at vårt slutpunkt må ha blitt  
framværende forhandlingene i Stockholm i morgen.

Statsministeren mottok i dag. Telefonen til utenrikskomiteen -  
denns formann med Regeringen mente det var helt nødvendig  
straks å underrette utenrikskomiteen om sine erfaringer. Hambro  
svarte at han ville overvære å kalle sammensatte komiteen i morgen.

Ref. optatt ved adv. Helmerdahl

Personeleg vil jeg legge til at beslutningene om a være  
nei på den kritiske henvendelse blir ustemt med. Forut-  
settningene var dog et op skulde tas opp igjen hvis Sverige  
mot formodning skulde være ja

Jeg vil slutten nevne at det var et par av reg. medl.  
som var nokk så infisert av skandinavisk brukemåte "Vi  
måtte ta det mestest for a hjelpe Finland og dermed  
rette Norge" Jeg har tatt beslutning avstand fra denne  
opfatning og uttrykt mig slik at en lunge jeg er stats-  
minister skal ikke landet frivillig gå inn i Kriget

E. S. søndag 3/3 Utenriksråd Bille har mottatt  
fra Stockholm at Sverige har svart nei allerede  
i onsdag aften

Ju

## DOCUMENT NO. 28

*Utenriksdepartementet*

Oslo, 15 februar 1940.

2 vedlegg.

Strengt fortrolig.

4

MED SVAR SES OPPGITT

J.nr.

4346/40.

Herr Statsministeren.

De nordiske lands nøytralitet. Uttalelser  
av den britiske marineminister.

-----

Jeg har den ære å sende vedlagt til

./.

./.

kunnskap gjenpart av en strengt fortrolig skrivelse fra  
legasjonen i London av 5.ds. (nr. 372) med 1 eksemplar av  
det dermed innsendte vedlegg.

For Utenriksministeren :



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*beredning*

Avskrift.  
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Royal Norwegian Legation

London 5.februar 1940.

Nr. 372.

Rapporter fra Legasjonens  
pressemedarbeider: Churchill.

1 bilag ( i 3 ekspl.)

302 L. 30.1.40.

STRENGT FORTROLIG.  
-----

Utenriksdepartementet.

Jeg vedlegger tre avskrifter av herr Martinsens  
brev til mig av 2. Februar.

Herr Martinsen hadde på forhånd fortalt mig,  
at han sammen med andre pressefolk var innbudt til lunsj  
for å treffe Churchill. Vi var enig om at han måtte optre  
meget forsiktig, og det har han sikkert også gjort.

(u) Erik Colban



Avskrift.

(Fra M. Martinsen, 2.2.1940)

HEMMELIG.

til

Hr. Minister Colban.

Der var pressefolk fra alle nordiske land tilstede ved lunchen Mrs. Philipmore gav idag for Mr. Churchill, og hvor denne slo sig løs og var til å begynne med bitter over den måte hans tale med råd til de neutrale var mottatt på. Han konkluderte med å foreslå at Norge og Sverige skal gjøre sig klar, hjelpe Finnland, men gjennom sine ministre i London be om å få hjelp efter en plan som skulde fremlegges hemmelig og bli gjenstand for drøftelse.

Jeg tillot mig å antyde forsyninger, idet jeg (i den halvtimen vi ventet på Churchill) hadde talt med hans forgjenger i embedet (under siste arbeiderregjering), Mr. Alexander, som lovet i Underhuset og i konferansene i Admiralitetet å passe på at vi får forsyninger. Han visste om smålighetene i Ministry of Economic Warfare og alle vanskelighetene, som han nærmest moret sig over. Vi skulde ikke være redde for det, sa Alexander.

Churchill var i samtalens løp meget bitter over den mottagelse hans berømte tale hadde fått av de neutrale. Men han forstod vår reserverthet og også dette at vi ikke er beredt. Jeg forklarte ham, at vi er ikke lenger enn England ved München-dagene; da lo han bittert.

- 2 -

Han raste hele tiden mot Norge og Sverige, især Sverige (mens Danmark hadde han allerede "avskrevet", det var uråd å forsvare Danmark, som han sa åpent "vilde bli tatt av Tyskland, før eller senere."

Det var den svenske malm som ikke måtte gå til Tyskland, og han påstod at den fra Narvik gikk innenfor tremilsgrensen, og derfor hadde han ekle ord å si mot Norge, nevnte endog de tre båtene som han påstod var torpedert innenfor tremilsgrensen. Da måtte jeg atter rykke ut og fortelle, at den norske utenriksminister i Stortinget hadde påvist at de tre båtene ikke var torpedert, og at de to var sunket utenfor tremilsgrensen. Han hadde ikke hørt om den norske utenriksministers redegjørelse (har sendt Daily Herald en kort redegjørelse om det, da man i det blad forespurte i sin tid. Men man trykker det neppe nu, da det man var efter var, at de tre båtene var torpedert innenfor vort sjöområde.)

Churchill vilde ha olje fra Romania stoppet, men innrømmet at det var høist vanskelig. Så raste han videre mot svensk malm, men innrømmet at dagen efter at malmen stoppes vil "Stockholm bli bombet" som han med synsk klokskap sa. Og efter å ha sittet og drømt litt, var han enig i at Nordiske statsmenn har grunn til å betenke sig to ganger, förenn de styrter land og folk ut i ulykken.

Han var enig med Mr. Alexander i, at den beste måte hvorpå vi innblandes i krigen - hvilket var det store mål - vilde være ved å gå med på Finnlands side.

- 3 -

Han anså hjelp til Finnland for det viktigste av alt, men de allierte kunde bare optre indirekte. En annen sak var hvis de norske fjorde blev satt i fare. Da lovet han, at den britiske flåte skulde komme.

Men tropper kunde ikke England sende, da tyskerne er leie å kverke, og han spådde atter og atter igjen at krigen blir mer langvarig enn han hadde tenkt sig fra begynnelsen av.

Jo mer man hørte på hans ord, der ofte var preget av ukyndighet og mangel på direkte kunnskap, fikk man det inntrykk at den politikk Norge og Sverige har ført er den riktige. La være, at der blir krangel om den svenske malm. Svenskene sa, at man overdrev dens betydning og at tyskerne med biland også har malmgruber og kan klare sig uten svensk malm.

Churchill mente at svenskene burde si til tyskerne, at man er lei for at tilførselene må stoppes, men det skyldes den finske affære: Norden må ha alt selv, og mange grubefolk er mobilisert. Man klarer ikke å sende noe foreløbig.

Og han vilde, at vi skulde love, at ingen malmbåt fra Narvik får gå innen territorialgrensen. Og at vi gjennom vår Minister i London skal fremlegge vore krav om tilførsler, så skulde han sørge for at vi ikke blev for-fordelt. Han trodde Norges suverenitet var garantert av England (noe som jeg også måtte rette

- 4 -

på) og han erklærte, at ikke kunde han finne sig i, at noen satte sig fast på vor kyst. Og kynisk sa han, at man i sitt stille sinn nu og da kunde ønske, at de Nordiske land gikk med på den annen side, slik at man kunde velge de strategiske punkter man behövet, og ikke noe mer. Det var stygt sagt, og der blev isnende kuldes taushet en stund. Så forsikret han atter at han forstod de neutrales vanskeligheter, og han forklarte hvorfor de allierte må vinne, at tyskerne var langt sterkere i keiserens dager, at usikkerheten brer sig i Tyskland, men at det vil ta tid. Og han skildret mesterlig tyskernes grusomheter tilsjöss, mente det oplagt var svakhets-tegn, og han håpet at amerikanerne iallfall vilde være med å garantere freden, og hjelpe til med løsning av økonomiske problemer når krigen var undavgjort.



Men Norge og Sverige burde konferere sammen om den linje de akter å følge i tilfelde av krig, og hvad de behöver og hvad de venter av støtte. Og dette burde de fremlegge gjennom sine ministre i London, og jo för desto bedre, sa han. Dette siste understreket han et par ganger.

Deres ærbödiga

(u.) M. Martinsen.







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Britain's designs on Norway; documents c



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